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CONTENTS

1 June 1990

POLITICAL

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

High Cost of Supplying Soviet Army [SVOBODNE SLOVO 23 Mar]	1
Slovak Nationalism Seen as Factor in Elections [Vienna DIE PRESSE 1 Apr]	1
Provincial Bohemia Gets Ready for Elections [Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE 12 Apr]	2

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Historiography Revision Targets Examined [Bonn DAS PARLAMENT (AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE supplement) 9 Mar]	2
--	---

YUGOSLAVIA

Proposed Program for Future Serbian Youth Party [NON 4 Mar]	14
Leader of Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia Interviewed [VJESNIK 1 Apr]	18
Croatian SDP Chairman Vujic Interviewed [VJESNIK 1 Apr]	20
Kosovo Problem Traced to 1966 Brioni Plenum [POLITIKA 7 Mar]	23

MILITARY

HUNGARY

Details of Debrecen Soviet Airfield Negotiation Controversy	26
Substance of Dispute, Ownership Issues [NEPSZABADSAG 17 Apr]	26
Search for Missing Documents Continues [NEPSZABADSAG 18 Apr]	26

YUGOSLAVIA

Commander of Pristina Army Corps Interviewed [NARODNA ARMIJA 8 Feb]	27
---	----

ECONOMIC

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Unemployment Increase, Problems Examined [Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV Mar]	32
---	----

POLAND

Growth in Regional Unemployment Rate 'Not Alarming' [RZECZPOSPOLITA 10-11 Mar]	37
Regional Differences Noted in Breakup of Retail Monopolies [RZECZPOSPOLITA 12 Mar]	37
Monopolies of Industrial Enterprises Countered by Partitioning [RZECZPOSPOLITA 13 Mar] ..	37
State Motor Transport Partitioning Discussed [RZECZPOSPOLITA 15 Mar]	38
Transport Minister on Larger International Role for Airports, Ports [ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ 6-8 Apr]	39
Construction-Related Enterprises: Restructuring, Investments Sought [RZECZPOSPOLITA 12 Mar]	41
Regular Annual Setbacks in Fishing Industry Viewed [RZECZPOSPOLITA 12 Mar]	42

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

High Cost of Supplying Soviet Army

90CH0020C Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech
23 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by 'zc': "We Must Be in Fashion"]

[Text] The stationing of Soviet soldiers in the CSSR has cost our country a good several billion korunas. The Soviets are in error when they say that they have covered all the costs themselves. This comes out of an interview which newsmen were given by the Chief of the FMNO [Federal Ministry of National Defense] Directorate for Supporting the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, General Major S. Nadovic.

"Our directorate will carefully study exactly how much the stay of Soviet forces cost our country. I only ask that the public not be impatient. We want to have all the data verified 100 percent. It certainly will not be a small amount, however," General Nadovic stated further. He also answered the question put by the CTK [Czechoslovak Press Bureau] whether it was really 11,000 people living in Milovice as the command of the Central Group of Forces of the Soviet Army says: "According to the estimates of our experts, about 30,000 people are housed in Milovice." He further assured that in discussions of the governmental commissioners of the two countries the Soviets promised to keep the situation peaceful in the region of that staff center. An order was given, for example, according to which any Soviet soldier who violates coexistence with the local citizens will be immediately shipped back to the USSR. That is if he does not violate the Czechoslovak laws, naturally, in which case he would have to be judged according to them. "I do not think that the presence of units of the Czechoslovak Army would ensure peace and quiet. If there are not good intentions, there will never be peace. I am convinced that the Soviet soldiers want to leave without any unnecessary conflicts and problems. They do not have anything to do with the Brezhnev doctrine," emphasized S. Nadovic.

In response to the CTK's query whether the FMNO directorate can limit the illegal sale of arms or even the sale of automobiles and electrical appliances, he noted that in the last 6 years there was only one case of arms sales documented. There should not be any other trade in them. On the one hand, the Soviet Army has tightened up on record keeping and in addition all arms are sealed up before departure and the soldiers withdraw without them. The sale of goods? It is also prohibited, but on the other hand where there is no buyer, there is no seller. And on the offers of Soviet girls to marry with a "dowry" of Kcs 50,000 (and supposedly even more), S. Nadovic said with a smile, "Personally I have not run into this yet, but we must be in fashion when there is so much interest in us, eh? And do you think that our proud citizen would get involved in a 'commercial' marriage?"

Is it true that the Soviets are crossing the border without any customs inspection, was another question. "On the contrary, they undergo strict controls, especially the civilian employees and the soldiers' wives. Of course, the weapons are checked out and put under seal."

General S. Nadovic also gave information on the number of soldiers who had left our country as of yesterday morning. Already 4,642 persons, 325 tanks, 332 combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 1,335 trucks, and 91 cannons have said good-bye to the CSSR, all on 62 trains.

Slovak Nationalism Seen as Factor in Elections

90CH0068C Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
1 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by ag., b.b.: "Slovakia: Nationalists Revolt. The New Name of the Country Remains Controversial"—first paragraph is DIE PRESSE introduction]

[Text] Even now that the Prague parliament has agreed on the new country name of "Czecho(-)Slovak Federative Republic," nationalist spirits in the nation have not yet calmed down: On Friday thousands of Slovaks demonstrated in Bratislava against the parliamentary decision and demanded resumption of the negotiations about "full sovereignty for the Slovak nation." Observers anticipate that in the upcoming election campaign extremists deliberately want to play the "nationalist card."

Prague/Bratislava—Several thousand Slovaks gathered on Friday in front of the Slovak national council in Bratislava, protesting against the parliamentary compromise in Prague Thursday evening regarding the new name of the country. After a dramatic appearance by President Vaclav Havel, the federal assembly agreed on the name "Czechoslovak Federative Republic." In the Czech language the name will henceforth be written "Czechoslovak" in one word, but in the Slovak language it will be separated by a dash (Czech-Slovak).

The demonstrators in Bratislava are obviously not satisfied with this compromise. They supported a petition to the Slovak national council, in which it is called on to initiate "negotiations for full sovereignty and independence for the Slovak nation." The chairman of the Slovak national council, Rudolf Schuster, promised the demonstrators that the Bratislava authorities would discuss the demands in the petition with the federal assembly in Prague.

Many of the nearly 5 million Slovaks have been complaining increasingly loudly since the revolution of November 1989 that their national identity is not being sufficiently taken into account by the Czech side. The Czechs, on the other hand, refer to the considerable

autonomy already enjoyed by Slovakia within the federation. Both parts of the country have their own governments and authorities; the official school language in Slovakia is Slovakian, and it also has its own parties and media.

But with about 600,000 Hungarians and 300,000 gypsies Slovakia also has considerable minorities on its own territory. A conflict finally broke out with these minorities when the leader of the "Public Against Violence" movement, Hungarian-descended Jan Budaj, was to be named the new chairman of the Slovak national council. Under the slogan "We Don't Want the Hungarian Budaj," his election was blocked by nationalists.

Observers anticipate that the delimitation maneuver vis-a-vis the Czechs will also be controlled by Slovak nationalists: Slovakia will hold elections on 8 June as well, and the election campaign has not even really begun.

Provincial Bohemia Gets Ready for Elections

90CH0090A Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German
12 Apr 90 p 9

[Article by Christoph Neidhart: "Good Advice From Swiss Socialist Party"]

[Text] "The elections are coming too late," says Augustin Cermak in Hradec Kralove, East Bohemia. "There are no emotions left." Since the middle of February, the engineer has been working only half days, from 0700 to 1100 hours. After that, "from 1100 to 2300," as he puts it, Cermak acts as the election campaign manager of the Citizens' Forum—would that be the party of President Vaclav Havel? Cermak corrects me: "The Citizens' Forum is not a party," (all Forum members make this correction, quickly and reflexlike), "it is a movement." However, in the context of the elections, it acts like any other party. "That is true; but our lists of candidates include people with no party affiliation."

In June the Czechs and Slovaks will elect their new parliament, or rather, a "constitution-writing assembly"—which is also the main election campaign slogan. Thereafter, in November, they will elect regional bodies (for which neither election districts nor structures have been determined to date; it is unlikely that the existing ones will prevail).

"I am 61 years old," says Cermak. "The last free election was in 1946. Most people have never experienced an election campaign. And the 1946 election was not altogether free either. There was much jubilation about freedom. The communists promised everything to the people—land for the farmers, trade licenses for the artisans, and leadership of the proletariat for the laborers."

We are sitting in a small villa, a sort of Jugendstil chalet, formerly the arts center, where the Citizens' Forum has found office space. For sale here are Havel buttons, little

flags, writings by Masaryk, independent newspapers, and tickets to the Citizens' Forum ball, which is advertised all over town by posters reading "We Need Money."

To the annoyance of one and all, the Communist Party still resides in the seats of power. Its officials rejected the alternatives they were offered. Now the Forum solicits signatures all over the country for a demand that the communists surrender their party treasury.

Cermak is asked whether he has had any instruction in how to conduct an election campaign. "Yes, I have—in Switzerland, in Bern." The Swiss Socialist Party had organized a seminar for 18 Czechoslovak campaigners.

Until now, Hradec Kralove had been a fortress of communism, "Red Hradec." This week there will be a meeting of all local parties, to agree on how to conduct a fair election campaign. Every Wednesday Cermak travels to Prague, for meetings of Forum campaign managers from all over the country. Besides that, he manages everything—from leaflets to speakers for campaign meetings.

There, the meeting chairman had best say "Either we win, or we charter a airplane to Bolivia for the day after the election, or I hang myself," says Cermak. "In Poland the 'Citizens' Committee' won 99 out of 100 senate seats."

It is important, he says, to mobilize the people. After Havel became president, they thought it was all over, when in fact the work had just started. "Anyone who fails to vote is in fact voting for the communists."

Next Wednesday the Czechs will go on strike, for only 10 minutes—from 1150 hours until noon, so as to spare the economy further damage. The strike is directed against the Communist Party, against the fact that it refuses to surrender its revenues, its buildings and its money. The strike was not organized by the Citizens' Forum, but by the CKD workers in Prague.

The Forum was glad to go along with the strike idea. This is certainly useful for the emotions.

"The local elections will be even more difficult," thinks Cermak, who says that he himself returned from an internal exile last November. Those elections will take place later. Their slogans? "One hardly knows where to start."

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Historiography Revision Targets Examined

90GE0075A Bonn DAS PARLAMENT (AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE supplement) in German
No B 11/90, 9 Mar 90 pp 3-15

[Article by Dr. Hermann Weber, professor of political science and contemporary history at the University of Mannheim: "'Blank Spots' in GDR Historiography"]

[Text]

I. Tasks of Historiography After the Political Upheaval

The revolutionary transformations in the GDR are bringing dramatic changes for the science of history there. The "leading role" of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany]—not removed from the constitution until 1 December 1989—meant not only the control of the entire political and economic system through the hegemonic party but also the subjugation of the social sciences under the directives of the party leadership. For decades, the historians in the GDR were subject to the axiom of the former chief ideologist, Kurt Hager, "that in all of its work the science of history is always guided by the political requirements of the current struggle and therefore must proceed from the decisions of the party."¹ Specifically this meant the creation of a picture of history the central function of which lay in the ideological legitimation of the domination of the SED.

Until October 1989, therefore, the point of view of historiography in the GDR differed fundamentally from the historical research in the FRG, especially with respect to the basic areas of the science of history in the GDR: the history of communism as well as the historical development of the GDR. In the FRG, the historical GDR research analyzed the history of the other German state critically and with differentiated methods and assessments in accordance with scientific pluralism. In contrast, the GDR historiography essentially handled the development of its own state and the "forerunners" apologetically. This naturally also affected the dialogue between the GDR research here and the science of history in the GDR. To be sure, the beginnings of a discussion recently became visible in this journal.² Nevertheless, the GDR historians Heinz Heitzer and Gerhard Lozek insisted on the basic theme that a questioning of the "leading role" of the SED must be rejected "without compromise," because it offers "scarcely any basis for a productive dialogue."³

The so-called partiality of the GDR historiography meant that the SED leadership expected the historians to justify the political line of the party in the past and present. Since the SED supposedly always acted in accordance with the "inherent laws" of history, this was the view given historians. They had to convey usable facts so as to create the proper consciousness of tradition. The political-ideological instrumentalization of historiography allowed only "biased" uniformity instead of a multiplicity of representations and interpretations. Much more devastating than the constant self-praise of the own "formation and growth" was the fact that the official version remained the only one allowed, hardly any divergent opinions were heard and thus the pluralism indispensable for the science was absent. The party leadership demanded that the historians provide the "proof" for the fundamental statement of their ideology that the communists in the past were "always right," from which it was deduced that this is valid for the present as well as the future.

Because of the politicization, the GDR historiography was always in danger of treating history as the present projected backward, that is, of transforming the current policy into the past. After every correction of course, it turned out to be necessary to rewrite history.

For several years, however, there has been an increasing demand for historical accuracy of facts in addition to this partiality. Essentially the GDR historiography had gradually overcome the primitive Stalinist falsifications.⁴ To be sure, the partiality dominated but there was a state of tension between the claim of the party on the one hand and the scientific self-interest of historical research on the other: even though almost all historians belonged to the SED and were subject to its discipline, they tried to present supportable results and to create some latitude for themselves. The instrumentalization of the science of history became weaker the further it departed from the present. But there is no need to make special mention of the fact that the science of history in the GDR can also show some success. Contemporary history and history of the labor movement, especially the representations of the GDR history itself, remained subject to a distorted partiality. It is also here where one can find those "blank spots" that have to be worked on.

In recent years, in the framework of Gorbachev's reforms, Soviet researchers has been attempting to overcome the previous "taboos" of their historiography designated as "blank spots." As late as 1988, on the other hand, Kurt Hager had instructed that the GDR had "no reason to undertake a search for 'blank spots'."⁵ There was, however, no need at all to "search" for blank spots; everyone who dealt with history knew about the taboos. But the historians did not want any "discussion of mistakes" either and they were quite prepared to accept Hager's thesis. Current references to internal debates or manuscripts "in the drawers" cannot refute this: science is always public and until October 1989 there was hardly anything published in the GDR that could be evaluated as a critical treatment of "blank spots."

Whereas the shortcomings of the science of history in the GDR and the basic problems of "partiality" were a topic only in the West until October 1989,⁶ they suddenly attracted the interest of the public there as well with the political upheaval in the GDR. On 6 November 1989, three weeks after the "reversal" in the SED leadership, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the SED Central Committee spoke out. In contrast to its previous practice, it was now demanding that "historical research must not be given the task of legitimizing predetermined political values."⁷ Since then, they have not hesitated to take over the previously prohibited term Stalinism. They called for investigations on "the internal party development and the effects of Stalinism on the German labor movement before and after 1945, including the crimes to which Germans fell victim."

A few days later, the presidium of the GDR Society of Historians issued a statement. It demanded "the relentless clarification of the problems of Stalinism in German history." "Great deficiencies" and even "conceptually false views" were registered in previous representations of history, especially of the 20th century. Finally the Society of Historians demanded "openness in historical research and discussion and a multiplicity of standpoints and research methods."⁸

A number of leading historians have now taken a position. They verify many of the fundamental points of criticism of the GDR science of history that had previously been expressed only in the West. Karlheinz Pech called for an examination of what influence the "personality cult and abuse of power" had in the GDR.⁹ Siegfried Prokop said in an interview that everyone who "deals with the history of the GDR and has published in this area will have to ask himself where the mental scissors functioned or when he submitted to external regimentation."¹⁰ Walter Wimmer asked himself the highly explosive question: "What is the situation with respect to Stalinism in the history of the KPD [Communist Party of Germany]?" Instead of giving an answer, however, he referred to "much that has been lying in drawers until now."¹¹

The GDR historians Juergen John, Wolfgang Kuettler and Walter Schmidt together advocate "a renewal of the understanding of history in the GDR."¹² They state that the "professional science of history" was maintaining a cautious reserve, which means a "great loss of time and an enormous need to catch up." They confirm that there is a picture of history that "was largely glorified, purged of problems, contradictions, and conflicts and frequently downright ritualized." It was customary "to present the result in advance and then to make the processes and facts fit so that the desired result would come about. What is undesired is left out..." Finally: "We must free ourselves from external regimentation as well as from internal censorship... The understanding of history of the democratically organized socialist society needs a plurality of opinions, standpoints, ideological positions and research methods."

As early as August 1989, Walter Schmidt had announced some modifications and even demanded a "stronger differentiation of the Marxist-Leninist picture of history." But he named two reasons that are probably no longer valid today: "First, to intervene offensively with our conceptual views in the international Marxist discussion about the legacy of the labor movement and socialism." This was to be interpreted as distance to Soviet historians. Secondly, he wanted the differentiation "so as to be able to satisfy the growing intellectual needs of our socialist society."¹³ Above all Schmidt will hardly be able to sustain his thesis from August 1989 that "the enemy" wants to "discredit" socialism and that it is necessary "to thwart the ideological diversion."

In December 1989, the historian Kurt Finker from Potsdam wrote: "The main content of the criticism and

self-criticism in the area of the science of history in our country is probably the fact that it had to serve to justify current policy... The exclusion of the 'blank spots' that has been ordered for decades—to which, it must be said, not all historians have adhered—has provoked an increased and currently almost exclusive interest in these questions. So now it is above all the crimes of Stalin and the effects of Stalinism on the international labor movement and, among other things, on the KPD as well that are the focus of public attention. For too long, there was silence about this and Western publications concerning this were indignantly rejected as anticommunist imperialist propaganda."¹⁴

Rolf Badstuebner found "a crisis in our historiography" and above all that the "historiography on the GDR and SED has not, despite all the individual achievements, done justice to the requirements and needs."¹⁵ Juergen Kuczynski, Nestor of the GDR social sciences, pointed out the "many blank spots" of the previous GDR historiography, spoke of the necessary treatment of Stalinism and advised taking a more differentiated approach and learning from the "left-wing bourgeois historians."¹⁶

So the political renewal will soon lead to a rethinking within the science of history in the GDR. Those who for decades have advanced the self-criticism now being heard in the GDR can look at the changes with satisfaction.¹⁷ The generally unanimous notion that "blank spots" must finally be dealt with causes one to ask what areas are primarily involved.

II. Stalinist Purges

In general, the problem of Stalinism must be dealt with. The Stalinist purges, heretofore largely taboo in the GDR historiography, are thereby the focus for the time being. Rolf Richter prudently points out this topic: "The latest developments made people painfully aware of what for years was repressed, ignored or mentioned only in code form in the historiography of the GDR: that one cannot research and speak about antifascism and the German labor movement honestly and adequately without relentlessly clearing up the problems of Stalinism in German history."¹⁸

He considers it to be especially important to deal with the "fates of the German antifascists who became victims of Stalin's crimes." It is now acknowledged that the supposedly already completed rehabilitation of these victims is largely still pending. Thus, Walter Wimmer reports: "Many perceive the most urgent question—it is raised again and again in letters—to be the question of the victims of the Stalin-Yeshov-Beria crimes and their rehabilitation." He attests that the "naming of the names of many of the persecuted in our literature cannot fulfill the need for rehabilitation."¹⁹

As for the KPD-victims of the Stalinist purges and their rehabilitation, this question was taken up some time ago but initially only in the Soviet Union and in the West. In the GDR, under this massive pressure, they are just now

taking up the "blank spots." After the official rehabilitations of the victims of Stalin under the leadership of Gorbachev, an international appeal was issued in October 1987 "For the rehabilitation of the victims of the Moscow trials," which was supported by scientists and politicians in numerous countries. After the USSR Supreme Court had nullified the judgment against 20 (of 21) defendants in the third Moscow show trial in 1938 (Bukharin and others) on 4 February 1988 "because of the nonexistence of a criminal offense," German signers presented the appeal for the rehabilitation of all victims of the Moscow trials to the Soviet ambassador in Bonn. In the brief signed, among others, by Jakob Moneta, Hermann Weber, Peter von Oertzen, Lev Kopelev and Winfried Wolf, it was stated that German Communists who had fled from Hitler to the USSR were also victims of the Stalinist purges. It specifically named 13 leaders of the KPD and the actress Carola Neher. This was the point of departure for numerous discussions on the victims of Stalin.

After the delivery of the appeal in the Soviet Embassy on 29 April 1988, during a subsequent press conference, the fate of German Communists in the Stalinist purges was once again especially pointed out. This triggered a debate that was forced by the developments in the Soviet Union. There, in June 1988, the Supreme Court rehabilitated the defendants in the 1936 show trial (Sinovev, Kamenev and others) as well as those in the 1937 trial (Radek, Pyatkov, and others). In July 1988, Bukharin, Rykov and other defendants of the show trial were even "posthumously readmitted to the party."

But the SED continued to try to minimize the extent of the persecution. In its "Theses" on the 70th anniversary of the founding of the KPD (published in June 1988), it mentioned only the names of 10 leaders of the KPD who were victims of the Stalinist purges. At the same time, however, the SED had asserted that the German victims of Stalin had all long since been rehabilitated. These historical legends evoked opposition. Accordingly, a documentation came out in March 1989 that described the purges and criticized the SED's attitude toward them. In this volume "Blank Spots,"²⁰ 242 murdered or missing German Communists are presented in short biographies, as are 25 Germans arrested in the USSR who survived. Here, for the first time, the catastrophic extent of the purges among German emigre Communists is dealt with. The documentation verifies how tragically the Stalinist reprisals against the leading German Communists who emigrated to the Soviet Union worked out: more than 60 percent of them were victims of the purge. Of the 43 members or candidate members of the KPD Politburo in the Weimar republic, five were murdered under Hitler but seven under Stalin. Especially bad after the Hitler-Stalin Pact was the turning over of hundreds of German Communists to the Gestapo. Many of them ended up in German concentration camps, were some were murdered.

To be sure, the publication also prompted the historians of the GDR to debate the subject but they have not

published anything on it. Subsequently an appeal was circulated that was signed by 80 prominent historians and social scientists of the FRG as well as politicians of the SPD [Social Democratic Party], the Greens, and the DKP. It stated, among other things: "The magnitude of the Stalinist crimes against humanity can still not be determined precisely, although recently the most complete list of victims yet—about 350 names—was presented. With the background of the rehabilitation of the victims of the Moscow trials that has now taken place in the USSR and also with the background of the discussion in the FRG and Berlin (West) about the German victims of Stalinism and the refusal of the SED leadership to face up seriously to this unmastered past, a new appeal is necessary."²¹

At a press conference in Frankfurt/Main on 26 September 1989, the author Juergen Fuchs, who was banished from the GDR, Peter Schuett (former DKP party head), Willy Boepfle (KPD chairman in Baden until 1949), Sergey Slutsch ("Memorial" in Moscow) Jakob Moneta and Hermann Weber reported on the state of the discussion.²²

But it was not until November 1989 that the explosive subject for the SED was taken up in the GDR. At the beginning of December, Walter Wimmer named a rather large number of KPD-victims of the Stalinist purges who had been "arrested under false charges."²³ Short biographies of most of the persons listed there (namely 39) had already been printed in "Blank Spots." Beyond that, Wimmer mentioned another 10 previously unnamed victims.

Historians are also mentioning Stalinism and the purges in the regional newspapers of the GDR. Thus, Juergen Herrmann from Halle quoted from the frightfully affirmative resolutions of the KPD Central Committee on the occasion of the show trials from 1936 through 1938. In this connection, he writes: "German Communists and antifascists who went into Soviet exile to lead the difficult antifascist fight from there perished there and additionally were condemned by their own party leadership."²⁴

There is a box entitled "Facts on History" on the same newspaper page. There they quote from "Blank Spots in History": "A look at the fate" of the leadership corps "is startling: of the 504 functionaries in the time span between 1924 and 1929, 86 were victims of Hitler and 43 of Stalin. Of the 376 functionaries in the time between 1929 and 1935, Hitler had 102 murdered and Stalin 27." But the source was not yet named. In the meantime, however, FREIHEIT was the first newspaper in the GDR to give an extensive and positive commentary on the volume by Jan Emendoerfer,²⁵ and the new "Sachbuchverlag Linksdruck" has already included "Blank Spots" in its spring program as one of the first books from the FRG.

Since the GDR historians themselves now intend to put forward a publication of the victims of the purge, there

will probably be additional victims of Stalin wrested from oblivion. The idea of "honoring the German Communists who were murdered at the time of the Stalinist despotism" at the "Memorial Place of the Socialists" in Berlin-Friedrichsfelde is also supported by Heinz Vosske, head of the archives of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism.²⁶ On the occasion of a special concert and an exhibition for the victims of Stalinism at the playhouse in East Berlin on 5 December 1989, the GDR author Christoph Hein called for the "eradication of the real existing socialism in the GDR." A long list of the victims of Stalinist arbitrariness in the GDR was read. Authors used the occasion of Stalin's 110th anniversary on 21 December 1989 to remember the victims of Stalinism (among others, Carola Neher and Alfred Rebe) in an event.²⁷

The purges were so multifarious that the research must consider the most diverse areas. Max Emendoerfer, the vice president of the National Committee "Free" Germany (NKFD) in Moscow, for example, was one of the victims of Stalinism. Active in the KPD prior to 1933 and arrested in the time of the Nazis, he deserted to the Red Army as a soldier in January 1942. His name "Soldier Max Emendoerfer" was among the appeals of the NKFD. In 1945, however, he was arrested in the house of the KPD Central Committee in Berlin and remained under arrest in the USSR until 1956. In his book "Rueckkehr an die Front" [Return to the Front] that came out in East Berlin in 1972, he was not allowed to write a word about this.²⁸ Not until now has the chief of the party archives of the SED declared himself ready to make available the sources there for research. Even before then, the members of the Central Institute for History had called for an "archives law" so that "all sources will be available to domestic and foreign historians 30 years after they come into being."²⁹

In the meantime, a greatly expanded reprint of the volume "Blank Spots in History" came out.³⁰ Therein they registered the discussion through December 1989 and expanded the list of victims.

But it remains to be said that this list of almost 500 KPD victims of Stalin is also still incomplete. Thus, it was recently reported in Sofia that more than 1,000 of 3,000 Bulgarian Communist emigrants became victims of the purge and 600 of them perished. Since there were more German political refugees in the USSR, the number of victims may also be higher. Meanwhile, voluminous material from the Komintern Archives in Moscow has come to the archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in East Berlin, so that a forthcoming thorough investigation of this complex appears promising. As for the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalin, Guenter Moeschner has come out with "Facts and Open Questions."³¹

III. Purges in the GDR

One thing was strictly taboo for historians in the GDR until October 1989: Stalinist repression against the population of the GDR as well as purges within the SED

itself. This subject was one of the "blank spots" never mentioned in GDR historiography. It had previously only been taken up in the FRG. To divert attention away from the Stalinist purges, it was always stressed in the GDR that there were never any show trials there. Even a somewhat critical author like Stephan Hermlin got carried away and asserted that the GDR was the only state among the people's democracies that "resisted Beria's instructions" and that the "courageous man" Ulbricht had not only refused to give "heads" to Beria but even told him to "go home."³² But it is and was known in the GDR as well that at the time Beria was the most powerful man in the communist empire after Stalin and that Ulbricht was one of the most devoted vassals of Stalin—nothing more needs to be said about Hermlin's perversion of history.

The SED itself prepared a show trial after the Rajk trial in Hungary in 1949. This is now proven by a letter with which Kurt Mueller, the former second chairman and representative of the KPD to the Bundestag, appealed to the then Prime Minister of the GDR Otto Grotewohl on 31 May 1956. Kurt Mueller described the bad practices of the Ministry for State Security and of its subsequent head, Erich Mielke. This informative document, which is being published here for the first time, is also of great importance for the science of history in the GDR and can help to eliminate blank spots.

The persecution of social democrats has also not been dealt with before in the GDR. In an appeal of the Kurt Schumacher Group, it is stated that 20,000 former social democrats lost their jobs through disciplinary punishment by the Stalinist SED, that 100,000 had to flee to the West and that 5,000 social democrats were convicted by East German or Soviet courts (400 of whom died in prison). It was proper, then, that in March 1989 the SPD Presidium demanded of the GDR that it acknowledge the injustice that was done to social democrats in the Soviet Zone of Occupation after the war. Many people, they say, had to pay for the accusation of "social democratism" with the loss of their freedom and this injustice ought to be designated as such.³³

These references alone indicate that the SED certainly had resorted to Stalinist reprisals. It likewise carried out the purges in its own ranks in the Stalinist style. The SED took the side of Stalin as early as the beginning of the conflict between Stalin and Tito. At that time, the SED was supposed to be transformed into a "party of a new type" within a few months. The SED immediately linked the increasing campaign against Yugoslavia with a party purge. On 29 July 1948, its executive committee passed the resolution on the "purging of the party from hostile and degenerate elements." With respect to the results of the Stalinization of the SED in 1948-49, meanwhile, it is confirmed: "Other opinions or views were denigrated as social democratism, Trotskyism, Titoism, and objectivism and labeled as hostile to the party. The accusation of thereby acting on behalf of imperialism served as a pretext for political reprimands or criminal prosecution. The result was the mass expulsion of party members,

disciplining and loss of social democratic and other traditions of the labor movement in favor of the communist dominant."³⁴

The Third SED Congress in July 1950 called for the strengthening of the "fight against spies and agents," above all against the "Tito clique," the Eastern bureau of the SPD and against Trotskyists. The leadership also wanted to do away with the "remnants of social democratism in the SED." The party members were called upon to "increase the revolutionary vigilance in its ranks in every way and to reveal and eradicate the bourgeois-nationalist elements and all other enemies of the working class and agents of imperialism, whatever flag they might be sailing under."³⁵ The jargon of the SED also corresponded to the original tone of the Stalinist purges of 1936 through 1938.

In the party review in 1950-51, 150,000 members were expelled from the SED. At the same time, the first great purges also began within the top leadership. Paul Merker, a leading communist since the 1920's and member of the first SED Politburo, was not reelected at the Third Party Congress. In August 1950, the SED Central Committee decided to expel him along with Leo Bauer, Willi Kreikemeyer, Lex Ende, and other old communists. They were accused of ties with the supposed U.S. agent Noel N. Field, the person of whom had played a central role in the accusations at the Budapest show trial in 1949 (these charges, however, were later officially revealed as falsifications).

The 1950's were marked by the Stalinist purges of the SED. They involved the expulsion and persecution of members, especially of officials, and replacements within the top leadership. Of the 80 members of the first executive committee in 1946, that is, the founders of the SED, more than one-fourth, namely 22 persons, subsequently lost their functions. Eight of these persons were even arrested in the GDR (Max Fechner, Max Fank, Willy Jesse, Paul Merker, Kurt Mueller, Fritz Sperling, Paul Szillat, and Stanislaus Trabalski). In 1946, 14 persons belonged to the top leadership, the Central Secretariat of the SED, of whom seven were forced out a few years later through purges (Anton Ackermann, Franz Dahlem, Max Fechner, Erich Gniffke, August Karsten, Paul Merker, and Elli Schmidt—of them Fechner and Merker were arrested and Gniffke fled). Since Kaethe Kern, Helmut Lehmann, and Otto Meier, as former social democrats, lost their leading positions, only Otto Grotewohl, Hermann Matern, Wilhelm Pieck, and Walter Ulbricht remained in the leadership core.

The first Politburo in 1949 included nine persons; of them, Fechner and Merker were later arrested. Dahlem and Ackermann were disciplined and Lehmann and Carl Steinhoff rapidly lost all influence. As for the five-member "small secretariat" of the Politburo that was formed at the same time, Franz Dahlem and Fred Oelssner were removed as "enemies of the party" and Edith Baumann and Paul Wessel were demoted. Walter Ulbricht was the only one to hold on to his power. For

the next Politburo in 1950 with nine members and six candidates (who also included Honecker), the following picture results: the members Franz Dahlem, Fred Oelssner, Wilhelm Zaisser as well as the candidates Anton Ackermann, Rudolf Herrnstadt, Hans Jendretzky, and Elli Schmidt—almost half of them—were later "purged." To be sure, most of them were "rehabilitated" after 1956 but none of these opponents of Ulbricht ever got back their previous positions. For years, they remained "nonpersons" for the GDR historiography.

The Stalinist reprisals that were long denied so vehemently took place in the GDR as well. One recalls the trials of Harich, Janka, and others. Just as in the case of the Stalinist show trials of Kostoff in Bulgaria and Rajk in Hungary in 1949 and of Slansky in the CSSR in 1952, there was supposed to be a show trial of leading communists in the GDR as well. DER SPIEGEL had reported on the planned show trial of Kurt Mueller and Leo Bauer, Paul Merker, and Franz Dahlem as early as January 1957. Such plans are also revealed in the previously suppressed notes of Franz Dahlem. This statement, now published for the first time, shows that as early as the spring of 1953 Dahlem was internally accused of cooperation with the American and "French secret services and even of connections with the Gestapo."³⁶ The carrying out of the show trial was by no means hindered by the SED leadership under Ulbricht but by the death of Stalin and the subsequent changes in the USSR.

A historian of the GDR is now finally looking into these Stalinist purges of the SED. In mid-December 1989, Guenter Moeschner stated that "at the beginning of the 1950's the former leadership of the SED suspected almost all the comrades returning from Western emigration or war captivity after 1945. They were not allowed to perform any higher functions."³⁷ There ought to be a special research program for this chapter as well as for the investigation of the purges in the SED, about which Moeschner has something to say at this time: "Such 'treacherous connections' were 'disclosed' on 24 August 1950 and 20 December 1952 in the resolutions of the SED Central Committee or of the Central Party Control Commission (ZPKK) organized in the fall of 1948, respectively. The Central Committee passed another similar resolution on 14 May 1953. Passed after Stalin's death (6 May [author's note] correct: 6 March, H.W.) 1953), it fortunately could not go into full effect.

"Among those most heavily accused were meritorious officials of the KPD who involved themselves in the antifascist-democratic upheaval sincerely with all their strength and who had participated in laying the foundation of the GDR: Paul Merker (member of the SED Executive Committee and its Politburo until mid-1950), Lex Ende (formerly chief editor of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Bruno Goldhammer (previously leading employee of the Office for Information under the GDR Council of Ministers), Willi Kreikemeyer (general director of the German Railroad after 1945) and Leo

Bauer (most recently chief editor of the German Broadcasting Station). The named persons were expelled from the party. They fell under the jurisdiction of the Soviet security agencies or military tribunals. Also expelled from the party and in part subjected to further reprisals were Walter Beling, Erich Besser, Bruno Boettge, Erhard Guenther, Gertrud and Wieland Herzfelde, and Margarete Merker. Franz Dahlem was expelled from the Central Committee as well as the Politburo and also received a strict reprimand."

Moeschner speaks of the later "more or less halfheartedly rehabilitated comrades" and shows how many blank spots have to be dealt with in this connection. The mention of Leo Bauer, whom a Soviet court had originally sentenced to death, is to be welcomed as a late correction.³⁸ Moeschner also now verifies: "The rehabilitation came too late for many, namely for Lex Ende and Willi Kreikemeyer, who were no longer living." Precisely the example of Kreikemeyer shows how many blank spots would have to be removed in the investigation of the purges, although Otto Reinhold, for example, claimed in June 1989: "We are thereby also considering the fact that in the GDR there were no trials like those in other socialist countries, no one perished in this way and we do not have to fetch any bodies out of the cellar."³⁹ This was the usual method of masking reality. For Willi Kreikemeyer died in a prison of the State Security Service and this is not reported to this day.

The old communist Kreikemeyer (full-time functionary of the KPD since 1922) returned to Berlin from Western emigration in 1946⁴⁰ and eventually reached the top of the German Railroad as general director. He was arrested on 25 August 1955 and has been missing since then. His wife returned to France, where in 1955 she was informed of Kreikemeyer's "rehabilitation." In 1957, she received a letter stating that her husband died in Berlin on 31 August 1950 but "at that time they failed to register him in the book of deaths." Leo Bauer had reported, however, that he was confronted with Kreikemeyer several months after being arrested. This is why Frau Kreikemeyer protested against the "determination" of the time of death and instead she demanded a physician's certificate with an indication of the cause of death as well as the place where her husband is buried. She never received an answer to this. In a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND interview with veterans, it is now said that Kreikemeyer was "driven to his death."⁴¹ It is still unclear what actually happened at that time. To have remained silent about such a fate is a serious omission for the GDR historiography and additional investigations must begin on this as well.

The question is also raised of how in the future the historians in the GDR will judge those who fled early because of the Stalinization of the SED—people like Erich Gniffke, Wolfgang Leonhard or Alfred Kantorowicz. On 5 January 1990, the Supreme Court of the GDR "reversed" the 1957 sentence against Walter Janka and his codefendants and "freed them from all guilt."⁴² The codefendants of that time are now named: Gustav Just,

Heinz Zoeger and Richard Wolf. (Heinz Zoeger—just as Manfred Hertwig, who was condemned in the Harich trial—was allowed to flee to the West after serving his sentence). Here as well, the GDR historiography is setting for itself the task of investigating these trials and their consequences.

The repression and purges did not involve only the top politicians and functionaries but were a mass phenomenon. Initiative groups are already forming in the GDR to "pursue the injustice that was done to people in our country because of their political commitment."⁴³ The established historical research is acquiring healthy competition here in dealing with history critically. Above all, however, the purges are to be linked with the Stalinization of the Soviet Zone of Occupation [SBZ]/GDR at the end of the 1940's. Hence a look back at the metamorphosis of the state institutions and the transformation of the parties and organizations prior to the founding of the GDR are worthy of special attention. In this connection, the GDR historiography can also resort to the "SBZ Handbuch" that has just come out in the West.⁴⁴ Precisely the early phase in the Soviet Zone of Occupation with the change of the general political line from the "German way to socialism" to the transfer of the Stalinist model or the transformation of the SED into a "party of a new type" has heretofore been presented largely apologetically and palliatively by the GDR historiography. Serious research is required here.

IV. Problems of Stalinism

Until a few months ago, the term "Stalinism" was taboo in the GDR. Since the politicians, from Krenz to Gysi, have begun to speak about Stalinism as a matter of course, the historians have been doing so as well. John/Kuettler/Schmidt are demanding a "relentless clarification of the problems of Stalinism, especially in German history."⁴⁵ Almost all the historians of the GDR are now making this demand but so far clear statements and definitions have been lacking. Thus, for Siegfried Prokop, for example, there are "three different conceptual interpretations," namely that of Trotsky, an "anti-communist" and a "Marxist" interpretation. He is thereby contributing more to a conceptual confusion, for he is immediately judging that the "anticommunist" concept of Stalinism is employed "in the sense of the doctrine of totalitarianism." "Stalinism" thereby implies a differentiation of the notion of communism. The applicability of a uniform doctrine of totalitarianism is put in question precisely in that Leninism is differentiated from Stalinism. Only later did Prokop go into the terror of Stalinism, which he labeled as "unpatriotic and misanthropic and aimed against socialism." Guenter Rosenfeld described the extent of the terror. He has for the first time given an overview of the Stalinist purges. In his article in *GESCHICHTSUNTERRICHT UND STAATSBUERGERKUNDE*, he also says that "demonstrably" more than 240 German Communists were murdered.⁴⁶

A criticism of Stalinism by historians Horst Lehfeld and Pavel Dohm is also unsatisfying when the authors write: "In our opinion, Stalinism as a political system expresses a specific form of statism. It came into being and acted as a model of an accelerated development of socialism under the conditions of the absolute predominance of extensively expanded reproduction and the associated low level of production forces." Dieter Segert rightfully pointed out the diversity of Stalinism, which had "a thousand faces." But, as was said elsewhere, a "scientifically founded concept to explain Stalinism" is still lacking.⁴⁷ In the USSR, numerous attempts have already been made to define Stalinism but the historians of the GDR obviously have yet to take notice of them. Above all the now widespread interpretation of Stalinism as "administrative-bureaucratic socialism" means a palliation and minimization of this despotism. In more recent Soviet investigations, there is both the definition of Stalinism as a "system of bureaucratic absolutism" and its moral judgment as a "repulsive, untruthful, brutish, and unpatriotic phenomenon."⁴⁸

In attempting to analyze Stalinism as a historical stage of the communist movement, one must distinguish above all between Stalinism in the more narrow or special sense—this would be despotism and the personality cult—and a broader and more fundamental assessment of Stalinism as a social and political system. In this general sense, Stalinism is to be designated as the supremacy of the apparatus and of the hierarchically organized bureaucracy. The core of the social and political system of Stalinism is the predominance of the communist one-party system: with the complete exclusion of internal party democracy, the social and political decisionmaking authority is in the hands of the hierarchically structured party leadership alone. The Communist Party is a hegemonic party, that is, it has the power monopoly to which the entire political system is subjected. After the seizure of power, the securing of its hegemony—with a continually growing claim to leadership—became the deciding objective. It did not tolerate a sharing of power and certainly not its legal replacement. It did not allow any pluralistic tendencies, not even internal party democracy. As the leading body, it was master of all public life (and even sought to direct the personal lives of the citizens). The hegemonic communist party therefore exercised comprehensive dictatorial rule with claims to absolute power.

The two drastic characteristics of Stalinism in the more narrow and special sense developed in particular after the purges in the 1930's. First there was the despotism characterized by complete legal uncertainty: the despotic power of the leadership was in reality limited neither through laws nor through institutions or controllable from below. The power of the secret police—including over the party—and bloody "purges" were the essential means of control by the centrally organized leadership. Secondly, part of Stalin's absolute power was an unsurpassable cult of his own person; this Stalin cult was supported by a dogmatized ideology, that of Marxism-Leninism.

Stalinism in general as well as in the special sense was transferred to the East European countries and thus to the Soviet Zone of Occupation—an independent occupation area—or to the GDR after 1945. It was not until after Stalin's death and especially after the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 that the communist parties sought gradually and more or less intensively to overcome the personality cult as well as the despotism, that is, the special Stalinism, through a "de-Stalinization."

The basis of the regime of terror, the concentration of power in the hegemonic party, remained largely untouched, however. The decisive characteristics of Stalinism as a social and political system (that cannot simply be labeled as "communism" because these forms were only developed under Stalin) continued to exist: the ideological claim that the party is "always right"; the organizational principle of the hierarchical democratic centralism; the selection and control system of the "nomenclature" in cadre policy; the monopoly of the state and party in education, information and organization. Despite discernible attempts at the modernization of individual areas, the social and political system of Stalinism (or of neo-Stalinism) thereby remained in place in the SED as well.

The question of what Stalinism really is finally ought to be treated in depth by historical research in the GDR as well. There is a lack of clear definitions and above all there is no description and assessment of specific structures. Here as well, the historians are just beginning and there is a need for "new thinking" so as to pursue the debates that heretofore have been carried on in the USSR and in the West.⁴⁹

V. History of German Communism

The GDR historiography has long dealt intensively with the history of the communist movement, especially the KPD. It bears some of the responsibility for the previous legends and "blank spots" in this area. As late as May 1989, Hanna Wolf in *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND* turned against Soviet historians who had presented the policy of the Komintern under Stalin in a critical way. The fact that this Stalinist attitude, for which Hanna Wolf is only an example, was displeasing to most historians of the GDR even then is only now being expressed openly.

The problem of the Stalinization of the KPD and of its policies with respect to social democracy must be studied in a new light today. The KPD, founded at the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919, had lost its independence early through the assassination of its most important leaders Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht (January 1919).⁵⁰ In 1920, the KPD became a mass party of the radical left-wing German workers. As a section of the Communist International, it remained oriented toward the Bolshevik October Revolution and soon the German Communists saw the USSR as their political prototype and model for their future expectations. From 1924 through 1929, the KPD and all other communist parties fell under the wheels of Stalinization. Above all it came

to the complete dependence of the KPD upon the Komintern and the USSR and it also took over the Stalinist organizational structures. The Stalinization of the KPD meant the elimination of internal party democracy and the rise of a strictly disciplined and centralized organization, in which the leadership with the help of the hierarchically structured party apparatus (that is, the full-time party functionaries) determined policy.

With the world economic crisis, the rush to the KPD increased (1928: 130,000 members and 3.2 million voters; end of 1932: 252,000 members and 6 million voters). Until 1933, the KPD had pursued an ultraleft policy with its bewildering theories of fascism (all non-communists were labeled as fascists) and its main attack against the social democrats (who were defamed as "social fascists"). It thereby indirectly and involuntarily helped in the rise of Hitler's fascism. In 1935, to be sure, the party exercised self-criticism but mitigated it in the course of time. The failed ultraleft policy from 1929 through 1933 and the bitter experiences under the Hitler dictatorship, whose tyranny cost the lives of thousands of communists, continued to act as a "fascism trauma" in 1945.

These basic features in the development of the KPD had been largely veiled by GDR historiography. Instead, the party under Thaelmann's leadership was made out to be the only effective organization against fascism. Although critical aspects were also depicted and published in recent years and historians of the GDR had largely abandoned the primitive Stalinist falsifications customary until the 1960's, the basic tendency toward making the history of the KPD heroic essentially remained.

Critical questions are now being formulated in this area as well. Heinz Karl acknowledges "self-critically" that through "an inadequate and superficial approach" to Stalinism in the KPD the historians of the GDR have heretofore "contributed less to a clarification than to a repression of the problems."⁵¹ This late insight can hardly be contradicted. Karl considers the beginning of the Stalinization of the KPD to be the time of 1924-25 under the ultraleft leadership of Ruth Fischer. The actual Stalinization of the KPD, however, mainly began after 1925 and it is closely linked with the person of Thaelmann and the purging of the party from all opponents and enemies of Stalin (persons on the Left and Right and "appeasers").⁵²

Joachim Petzold advocates the rehabilitation of the "right-wing" communists expelled from the KPD and of the "appeasers," even though this will "naturally tarnish the picture of the KPD led by Ernst Thaelmann."⁵³ He is correct in asserting—long proven by documents in the West⁵⁴—that the KPD "continually aimed its main effort against the social democrats who were defamed as social fascists and even labeled social democracy as the main social support of the bourgeoisie at a time when Hitler's fascism was reaching for political power in Germany."

This verification of facts that heretofore have always been denied by historians of the GDR as "anticommunist" assertions is a gratifying example of their rethinking. Kurt Finker deepens this view when he writes that "the growing Stalinist influence, over the Komintern above all, also made the KPD more and more dogmatically rigid, prevented significant success in the fight against the reaction and complicated the timely creation of a broad antifascist alliance."⁵⁵ Finker's current statements are becoming more credible because he was the one who at a conference in May 1989 (to the horror of many of his colleagues) pointed out that the anticommunism of the SPD was also the result of the ultraleft policy of the KPD.⁵⁶

Rolf Richter points out that in the investigation of the history of the KPD "a picture marked by a false idea of continuity in its path right up to the recent past" was dominant.⁵⁷ Much clearer was Fritz Klein, who attacked some historians of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism because of their previous assessment of the history of the KPD and SPD: "Until now these people have used their real monopoly in those areas to put through dogmatic Stalinist positions, through which the development of the Marxist historiography of the GDR was effectively hindered."⁵⁸ An "Institute for the History of the Labor Movement" has now become the "legal successor" of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism.⁵⁹ But this is not supposed to be a "simple renaming"; one of the intentions is that in the future there should be "no more taboo subjects." Since the new institute is largely working with the same personnel, it remains to be seen how great the ability of the colleagues to learn is. Still, the latest statements on the history of the KPD allow one to expect that the Stalinization of the party will become a seriously investigated field of research in the science of history of the GDR.

VI. History of the GDR

The decisive "blank spots" are in the depictions of the history of their state by GDR historians. For this area in particular, it is valid what Heinz Karl said about the history of the KPD. Here there is not so much an "illumination" but rather a "suppression" of the problems. The most explosive questions about Stalinism and purges in the GDR have already been pointed out. In the following, I will bring to your attention some other subjects and the previously conflicting assessments of historians of the GDR and FRG.

In the question of the periodization of the history of the GDR, there was agreement with respect to drastic breaking points. That is so for the founding of the GDR in 1949, for the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 or for the replacement of Ulbricht and the Eighth SED Congress in 1971. In the characterization of the respective periods and above all in the interpretation of the determining factors, however, there were substantial differences of opinion between the historians in East and West: whereas the continuity on the way to "real socialism" is predominant for the historians of the GDR, the

breaks in the development are also treated in the FRG, whereby the achievement and securing of the authority of the SED are emphasized as important factors.

Even clearer are the differences between the Western GDR-research and the historiography of the GDR in the evaluation of outstanding facts and events in the history of the GDR. That is so, for example, for the founding of the SED in April 1946. For the historians of the GDR, the consolidation of the KPD and SPD into the SED in the Soviet Zone of Occupation was until now "a historic victory of Marxism-Leninism, the most important achievement since the announcement of the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels and since the founding of the KPD."⁶⁰ They asserted that the KPD and SPD had voluntarily merged into the SED. According to this version, the great majority of social democrats were in favor of the founding of the SED and had prevailed against a small minority of "right wing" opponents of unity, who were influenced by Kurt Schumacher in the West. In contrast, Western researchers advocate the thesis that the social democrats of the Soviet Zone of Occupation agreed to the "unity party" primarily under coercion and pressure (especially on the part of the Soviet occupation force). One can thereby refer to West Berlin, because it was there that the only free ballot took place among social democrats, the great majority of whom rejected the "unification."

These opposing basic positions remained unchanged even until recent investigations. Local studies from the GDR prove, however, that the group of social democratic functionaries who opposed the merger with the communists was much larger than previously admitted. Rolf Badstuebner is now calling for an investigation of the role of the Soviet Military Administration. "From the point of view of the problems of Stalinism, it is also a matter of a differentiated view of the position of the opponents of unity."⁶¹ It is also necessary to clarify the role of the concessions that the KPD leadership made to the social democrats: the new party should take a "German democratic path" (in differentiation to the Soviet Union). All functions should be divided proportionally between communists and social democrats and the party structure should be democratic. Whereas in Western research the opposing positions of the SPD leaders Schumacher and Grotewohl on the question of the unification have recently been discussed controversially,⁶² research in the GDR must still deal with the entire set of problems.

That is so in particular for another significant event in the history of the GDR. To be sure, in evaluating the worker revolt on 17 June 1953, the GDR historiography spoke of the "dissatisfaction and discord of working people" but it stuck with the assessment that 17 June 1953 is basically to be characterized as a "counterrevolutionary attempted rebellion" with "operational guidance" from the West. It is noteworthy, however, that as early as June 1989 Rolf Badstuebner pointed out that 17 June 1953 cannot "be called a counterrevolutionary rebellion." At that time, to be sure, he still considered it

incorrect to speak of a "national uprising."⁶³ Certainly this should soon be the subject of intensive discussion, for there is a need and a necessity in the GDR to review the portrayal of 17 June 1953.

The situation is similar with respect to other historical burdens of the SED and the GDR that must be disposed of as quickly as possible. That applies to the construction of the wall in 1961. Here the GDR historiography will have to portray the situation, Ulbricht's policy and the motives and results of the separation again, not least on the basis of the existing archival materials. Perhaps it can then provide some new insights. In general, the better access to the sources allows one to expect more differentiated assessments.

Such subjects as the role and structure of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany could be investigated in the West only with difficulty because of the source situation. Nevertheless, there are well-founded research results available—in the "SBZ Handbuch," for example.⁶⁴ The situation is similar in many other areas. For example, the "SBZ Handbuch" also documents the transformation of the parties and mass organizations as well as the beginnings of bloc politics,⁶⁵ whereas comparable work are still lacking in the GDR.

To be sure, the science of history in the GDR has dealt with the denazification in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in numerous studies but thereby did not mention at all that it was also instrumentalized there to consolidate the communist predominance. The fact that the Soviet occupying power—and later the courts in the GDR—punished war crimes and Nazi atrocities needs no special proof. But the Soviet military government and subsequently the GDR also prosecuted social democrats and other democratic forces under the cloak of denazification so as to eliminate all actual or potential opposition. This too is a chapter of history that has not yet been dealt with by GDR historiography.

Other areas of research that ought to be dealt with by historians in the GDR can only be mentioned in general here. The political and military share of the GDR in the suppression of democratic communism in the CSSR in 1968 must be investigated in an unbiased manner. It is important above all to depict the internal structure of the SED—command authority and control mechanisms—its nomenclature system and the effects of "democratic centralism" on the social structure of the GDR.

Finally, it should be mentioned that there are other shortcomings in GDR historiography: there is a lack of economic and social history, everyday history was left out and history of the society does not even exist in rudimentary form. Not only the previous party history of the SED but also the "official" depictions of the organizations (FDGB, FDJ [Free German Youth], and DFD [Democratic Women's League of Germany]) are untenable. Here as well, there is a lack of informative and critical portrayals in the GDR. A glance at the state of research⁶⁶ shows major gaps, "blank spots" that must be

eliminated. Beginnings are already discernible. A "Second Colloquium on the Reassessment of the History of the GDR" in January 1990 referred to the course set in 1948. Even Heinz Heitzer now confirms that there was an "interweaving of the party and state apparatus" in 1948.⁶⁷ Guenter Benser, now director of the "Institute for the History of the Labor Movement," acknowledged in an interview that "the power monopoly of the SED is the core of the problem," which he too did not want "to admit to this extent for a long time."⁶⁸

And finally the "native researchers, local chroniclers and company and church historians" want to question regional history "in a completely new and different way" and to overcome the "inherited burden" of Stalinism.⁶⁹

Even the military historians of the Military History Institute of the GDR are now prepared for a "critical stocktaking." They declare: "Never again should there be a picture of history decreed by a party for an entire direction of thinking."⁷⁰ Despite all of that, it is characteristic that the historian-publication ZEITSCHRIFT FUER GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT did not publish any self-critical position in its first volume for 1990 either.⁷¹ Historians of the GDR complain: "It is intolerable that the official representatives of the science of history of the GDR have so far maintained silence—publicly, at least."⁷² As correct as this criticism is, the question remains of whether the individual historians of the GDR are also self-critical about their own role. It was still the exception when as early as 7 November 1989 the Leipzig historian Helmut Braeuer wrote in "On the Responsibility of the Historian" that "one must ask about the share of neglect, omissions, and halfheartedness in the work of historians."⁷³

VII. Great Tasks of the Science of History of the GDR

The science of history of the GDR is well provided with personnel. Even when restrictions are to be expected (probably primarily in the SED's own institutes) in the framework of economy measures, there is still a considerable capacity. Decisive, however, is the fact that with the loss of the predominance of the SED the previous monopoly of a predetermined historical point of view and especially the party's instrumentalization of the science of history in the GDR are terminated.

The monopoly of a historiography defined as "Marxist-Leninist" and its absolute claim to truth can no longer be maintained. A pluralism of methods as well as of evaluations must and will prevail. A differentiated picture of history should replace simplification, justification, and uniformity as research principles. This view is obviously shared by many historians of the GDR today.

The treatment of Stalinism prevents itself as an overdue task for contemporary history. Historians of the GDR are rightfully making the most recent history the focus of their work and they must thereby overcome previous incorrect interpretations and "blank spots." The history book for the 10th grade was recently withdrawn and

declared "no longer relevant," because "facts were falsified or completely omitted" there. That is a warning and a sign finally to put a stop to excessive party optimism and lies.

The current discussions of the historians of the GDR make it apparent that they—although often without self-criticism—want to separate themselves from their past. This opens up new prospects for dialogue and cooperation.

Footnotes

1. EINHEIT, special issue, September 1962, p. 100. As late as 1988, Hager wrote: "A crucial task of the historians of the GDR is and remains the deepening of the socialist awareness of history." EINHEIT, 44 (1989) 7, p. 595.
2. See Heinz Heitzer/Gerhard Lozek, "Critical Comments on GDR Research in the FRG" in AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, B34/89, p. 18 and following pages.
3. Ibid., pp. 22, 24.
4. On the Stalinist falsifications, compare Hermann Weber, "Ulbricht faelscht Geschichte" [Ulbricht Falsifies History], Cologne, 1964.
5. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 10 June 1988.
6. On the state of research, compare Hermann Weber, "Die DDR 1945 bis 1986" [The GDR 1945 Through 1986], p. 105 and following pages.
7. The statement was disseminated by press agencies but did not appear in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.
8. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 14 November 1989.
9. See DER MORGEN, 18-19 November 1989, and JUNGE WELT, 11-12 November 1989.
10. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18-19 November 1989.
11. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 25-26 November 1989.
12. EINHEIT, 44 (1989) 12, p. 1,146ff.
13. EINHEIT, 44 (1989) 8, p. 764.
14. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16-17 December 1989.
15. NATIONAL-ZEITUNG, 2-3 December 1989.
16. TRIBUENE, 17 November 1989.
17. See, for example, Hermann Weber, "Demokratischer Kommunismus?", Hannover, 1969, p. 198 and following pages; Weber, "Kommunismus in Deutschland 1918 bis 1945," Darmstadt, 1983; "Kommunistische Bewegung und realsozialistischer Staat" [The Communist Movement and the Real Socialist State], articles on German and international communism by Hermann Weber, selected, issued and introduced by Werner Mueller, Cologne, 1988, p. 339 and following pages.

18. EINHEIT, 44 (1989) 12, p. 1,145.
19. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 25-26 November 1989.
20. Hermann Weber, "'Weisse Flecken' in der Geschichte. Die KPD-Opfer der Stalinschen Saeuberungen und ihre Rehabilitierung" ["Blank Spots" in History. The KPD Victims of the Stalinist Purges and Their Rehabilitation], Frankfurt/Main, 1989.
21. The appeal with the signatures is printed in DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 22 (1989) 11, p. 1,361 and following page.
22. See DAS PARLAMENT, 10 November 1989.
23. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 2-3 December 1989.
24. FREIHEIT, 5 January 1990.
25. FREIHEIT, 26 January 1990.
26. See NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 2-3 December 1989.
27. See NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 6 December and 23-24 December 1989.
28. See Max Emendoerfer, "Rueckkehr an die Front. Erlebnisse eines deutschen Antifaschisten" [Return to the Front. Experiences of a German Antifascist], East Berlin, 1972.
29. DER MORGEN, 9-10 December 1989; BERLINER ZEITUNG, 3 January 1990.
30. Hermann Weber, "'Weisse Flecken' in der Geschichte. Die KPD-Opfer der Stalinschen Saeuberungen und ihre Rehabilitierung" ["Blank Spots in History. The KDP-Victims of the Stalinist Purges and Their Rehabilitation], expanded new edition, Frankfurt/Main, 1990.
31. See NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 11 December 1989.
32. DER SPIEGEL, No. 6, 6 February 1989, p. 77.
33. Compare VORWAERTS, 18 March 1989.
34. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 3-4 February 1990.
35. Protocol on the Third SED Congress, 20-24 July 1950, Vol. 2, East Berlin, 1951, p. 250 and following page.
36. DER SPIEGEL, No. 5, February 1957, p. 30 and following pages. Articles on the history of the German labor movement, 32 (1990), 1, p. 22; for references to the planned show trial, see Hermann Weber, "The SED and Stalinism" in: "Die DDR im vierzigsten Jahr. XXII. Tagung zum Stand der DDR-Forschung" [The GDR in Its Fortieth Year. The 22nd Meeting on the Status of GDR Research], Cologne, 1989, p. 10 and following page.
37. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16-17 December 1989.
38. Compare the biography of Leo Bauer: P. Brandt/J. Schumacher/G. Schwarzrock/K. Suehl, "Karriere eines Aussenseiters" [Career of an Outsider], Berlin-Bonn, 1983.
39. UZ, 26 June 1989.
40. Compare the biography in Hermann Weber: "Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus" [The Transformation of German Communism], Vol. 2, Frankfurt/Main, 1969, p. 195 and following pages.
41. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16-17 December 1989.
42. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 6-7 January 1990.
43. BERLINER ZEITUNG, 19 December 1989.
44. Compare Martin Broszat, Hermann Weber (editor), "SBZ-Handbuch. Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre Fuehrungskraefte in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-49" [SBZ-Handbook. State Administrations, Parties, and Social Organizations and Their Leadership in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany 1945-49], Munich, 1990.
45. EINHEIT, 44 (1989) 12, p. 1,148.
46. FUER DICH, (1989) 48, p. 28 and following page and (1990) 4, p. 6 and following page; GESCHICHTS-UNTERRICHT UND STAATSBUERGERKUNDE, 32 (1990) 1, p. 45 and following pages.
47. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 23-24 December 1989; BERLINER ZEITUNG, 18 January 1990.
48. Original: Lew Gudakow and others, "Officialism and Bureaucracy," in KOMMUNIST, (1988) 12, German: "Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Antlitz des Socialismus" [Seaching for a New Face of Socialism], Moscow, 1989, p. 41. Soviet authors also refer to Stalinism as an "ideological-psychological complex" and Stalin's "autocracy" with the "nomenclature stratum" as his "solid support" or the "omnipotence of the apparatus." Compare Yuriy Afanasev (editor), "Es gibt keine Alternative zu Perestroika: Glasnost, Demokratie, Sozialismus" [There is No Alternative to Perestroika: Glasnost, Democracy, Socialism], Noerdlingen, 1988, pp. 654, 727; "Das Phenomen Stalin" [The Stalin Phenomenon], Moscow, 1988, p. 51.
49. As for more recent literature, compare, for example, Predrag Vranicki, "Marxismus und Sozialismus," Frankfurt/Main, 1985, p. 129 and following pages; Gernot Erler and Walter Suess (editors), "Stalinismus, Probleme der Sowjetgesellschaft zwischen Kollektivierung und Weltkrieg" [Stalinism and Problems of the Soviet Society Between Collectivization and the World War], Frankfurt/Main, 1982; Horst-Dieter Beyerstedt, "Marxistische Kritik an der Sowjetunion in der Stalin-Aera (1924-53)" [Marxist Criticism of the Soviet Union in the Stalin Era (1924-53)], Frankfurt/Main, 1987; Heiko Haumann, "Stalinism and De-Stalinization," in:

Dietrich Goldschmidt and others (editors), "Frieden mit der Sowjetunion—eine unerledigte Aufgabe" [Peace with the Soviet Union—an Uncompleted Task], Guetersloh, 1989, p. 135 and following pages; Werner Hofmann, "Stalinismus und Antikommunismus," Frankfurt/Main, 1967, p. 13; compare also "Kommunistische Bewegung" (Footnote 17), p. 67 and following pages.

50. As for the status of the research, compare Hermann Weber, "Kommunismus in Deutschland 1918-45," Darmstadt, 1983.

51. HORIZONT, 22 (1989) 12, p. 29.

52. See H. Weber (Footnote 40), Vol. 1.

53. EINHEIT, 44 (1989) 12, p. 1,153.

54. See: "Die Generallinie," circular letter of the KPD Central Committee 1929-33, introduction by Hermann Weber, Duesseldorf, 1981.

55. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16-17 December 1989.

56. See DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 22 (1989) 7, p. 800.

57. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 30-31 December 1989.

58. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 6-7 January 1990.

59. Ibid.

60. Heinz Heitzer, "DDR. Geschichtlicher Ueberblick" [GDR. Historical Overview], East Berlin, p. 48.

61. NATIONAL-ZEITUNG, 2-3 December 1989.

62. See the articles of Lucio Caracciolo and Klaus Suehl in: Dietrich Staritz and Hermann Weber (editors), "Einheitsfront—Einheitspartei" [United Front, Unity Party], Cologne, 1989, p. 76 and following pages.

63. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 10 June 1989.

64. See Jan Foitzik, "The SMAD," in: "SBZ Handbuch" (Footnote 44), p. 7 and following pages.

65. See Siegfried Suckut, "Blockpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945-49. Die Sitzungs-Protokolle des zentralen Einheitsfront-Ausschusses" [Bloc Politics in the SBZ/GDR 1945-49. The Meeting Minutes of the Central Unity Front Committee], Cologne, 1986.

66. See H. Weber (Footnote 6), p. 105 and following pages.

67. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 27-28 January 1990.

68. BERLINER ZEITUNG, 13-14 January 1990.

69. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 13-14 January 1990.

70. MILITAERGESCHICHTE, 29 (1990) 1, p. 3.

71. ZEITSCHRIFT FUER GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT, 38 (1990) 1. This remains incomprehensible

even when 5 October 1989 is given as the copy deadline; still, the journal was not delivered until the end of January 1990.

72. GESCHICHTSUNTERRICHT (Footnote 46), p. 23.

73. SAECHSISCHE HEIMATBLAETTER, 35 (1989), 6, p. 241.

YUGOSLAVIA

Proposed Program for Future Serbian Youth Party

90BA0044A Belgrade NON in Serbo-Croatian 4 Mar 90 pp 14-17

[Text of proposed program for new configuration of the League of Socialist Youth of Serbia: "Nook for Opposition: Social-Democratic Youth Alliance: Human Being Is Top Priority"—first paragraph is NON introduction]

[Text] The League of Socialist Youth of Serbia [SSOS] will most likely be transformed into the Social-Democratic Youth Alliance of Serbia. In this issue, we will publish the complete draft program for the future organization, and in future issues, we will write about the first results of public debate on the documents for the upcoming congress.

We are for a free, democratic, humane, and sound society.

Join us in our endeavor to live together, more freely, and more affluently than we have in the past.

Top priority is accorded the human being, the citizen, who freely expresses his thoughts and ideas, who is guaranteed equality regardless of his national, religious, or political affiliation.

Join us in our endeavor to affirm the full range of values: labor, morality, peace, and development.

Through a tolerant "project" dialogue, acting in accordance with the best traditions of political culture, before the public and with responsibility for public discourse and an exchange of arguments,

We support the following:

For: A Rule-of-Law State

A rule-of-law state ensures the rule of law. In contrast to the party state, the rule-of-law state guarantees the continual democratization of social relations and a shift in the limits of human freedom.

We support the following:

- respect for the fundamental principles of the rule of law;
- a constitutional division of power into legislative, judicial, and executive branches, ensuring an efficient, effective, and responsible state, and keeping it from becoming totalitarian and autocratic;

- a constitutional judiciary as a guarantor of the realization of constitutionality and of objective lawfulness;
- free elections, meaning political pluralism and a parliamentary struggle for power by political subjects;
- a "zone" of direct campaigns by citizens, through which influence can be exerted on the state and authorities by civilian society, through forms of civil "disobedience" and other forms of nonviolent campaigns on the basis of the free expression of ideas, petitions, public assembly, and gatherings.

For: Socialism and Democratic Society

The model of undemocratic and dogmatic socialism has failed, but this does not also mean the end of the very idea of socialism, which has never been realized in its original meaning.

We see the democratic society through the juncture of the humanistic orientation of socialism and the legacy of civilization in our contemporary world, which opens doors to us towards an economically developed and affluent society in which the freedom of the human being and individual will be the precondition for freedom for all.

We are committed to socialism and a democratic society with the following:

- various forms of ownership, from which everyone will struggle for his place on the market in fair competition;
- political pluralism and political competition, which also means a multiparty system;
- a parliamentary-presidential system of rule, in which the central political category will be the citizen with his inalienable rights;
- a rule-of-law state, with the rule of law and of the legal system;
- direct and secret elections from among several candidates;
- the democratization of the referendum as a form of direct expression of opinion by the citizenry concerning all important social questions;
- an independent and democratic public opinion and public;
- a market economy with economic lawfulness and economic logic;
- public financing of social activities.

This formulation of an "outline of socialism" with humanistic and democratic principles will also be subject to further changes that will return it to its democratic and human form.

For: Political Pluralism

The basic postulate and fundamental right of every political democracy is the right to free political association and organizing, because that is the legitimate process of articulating the multitude of interests that exist in

society and that want to be expressed on a political level, without the tutelage and monologue of any sort of organized political force.

Within the framework of our commitment to free political organizing and association, we support:

- a multiparty system, whereby it is up to the free will of each citizen/individual to realize it or not to realize it;
- the free establishment and activity of new social movements, associations, alliances, organizations, groups, and so forth;
- the depoliticization of state organs and public institutions and the territorial principle of political organizing;
- worker management, and not self-management.

This stipulation of political pluralism, regardless of the extent to which it is defined according to the demands of our times, has its "roots" in the historical and democratic tradition of Serbian socialist thought, which was also the model for the Yugoslav organizations that later developed on the achievements of the ideas of the 20th-century Serbian socialist movement.

The limits on the freedom of political organizing must be regulated through the Constitution and laws of the SFRY. Legal relativism will safeguard the rules of political competition between political parties, the rules concerning their founding and work, and measures prohibiting the founding of parties that advocate inflaming national, religious, or racial animosity and inequality and that advocate the violent overthrow of the social order and the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

For: Yugoslavia

The historical and civilizational ties between the nations and nationalities in this region, as well as European and world interdependence and respect for the principle of the nondivision of the indivisible, commits us to Yugoslavia:

- a democratic and efficient state;
- a state whose legal and political system allows freedom and equality of expression and participation by individuals, groups, organizations, alliances, associations, and parties, with electoral competition between their economic and political programs, under the condition that they exclude violence and national, cultural, religious, and other intolerance;
- a state that will provide conditions for the unhindered flow of labor, capital, know-how, people, and ideas in all of its territory.

We have resolved to live in:

- a federation, structured with national equality of the nations and nationalities, with equal republics responsible for the development of Yugoslavia and for their own development, with a unified Serbia within the framework of which there are two autonomous provinces without sovereignty, and for the

introduction of uniform criteria for the formation of provinces in the territory of Yugoslavia, where there are historical, ethnic, cultural, and other specific qualities for this;

- a federation that through a parliamentary-presidential system will express the subjectivity of the citizens on the one hand and the equality of the nations and nationalities on the other hand, with precisely defined authorities exercised by the federation and the federal entities.

We support a parliament that, as the highest representative body, will be chosen in free, direct, secret elections.

The federation must be the guarantor of the territorial whole, security, defense, the country, its international position, the unified Yugoslav market, a unified monetary, fiscal, currency, and customs policy, economic relations with foreign countries, and the health of the environment.

The federation must have authority throughout the entire territory of Yugoslavia, as well as instruments and organs for executing it.

For: Mixed Economy, Managers, Entrepreneurs, Stockholders...

We are committed to socialism with a market-based form of doing business.

A true consumer economy presupposes an integral market, or rather a market of capital, labor, goods, services, and ideas. Democracy cannot exist with a monopoly on power, and economic efficiency cannot come from a monopoly on ownership. Thus, we demand a constitutional guarantee of pluralism, of equal forms of ownership. Social ownership must become either the object of "nationalization" into public corporations or the object of "privatization," with different combinations of individual ownership rights (for example, through worker stock ownership).

The enterprise must first become a commodity, the object of the exchange of goods (buying and selling), in order to ascertain its worth. An independent enterprise must be a profit center. It must be under the control of those who have invested capital in it, who aspire to increase the value of that capital.

The enterprise is led by managers, professionals who acquire their professional expertise at specialized schools for managers, who create economic policy; they do not wait and ask questions, but rather produce. Managers evaluate their business know-how on the market for managers, where their intellectual property assumes the characteristic of capital.

The workers know the price of their labor because it is established on the market for labor, and they also gain the power of control, but also become entrepreneurs. We support the entrepreneur who wants to win, to succeed,

not only for the sake of the fruits that success brings, but also for the sake of success itself, as a demonstration of ability.

The state should support enterprises here, but it should not protect them if they are unable to survive. The state must be a service to the private economy, analyzing signals from the global and domestic markets, instigating all business initiatives, guaranteeing the legal order, checking compliance with public and general needs. Administration must have its own economic foundation.

The youthful, entrepreneurial spirit of the unemployed will emerge from respect for the principle of self-organization and self-employment. The unemployed need institutions (League of Unemployed Persons, Syndicate of Unemployed Persons, Company for Founding Companies...) that will articulate their interests most adequately and that would argue most effectively for fulfillment of their demands, but also state nonprofit agencies for unemployed persons that are run with risk capital.

For: Agrarian Issues and Free Farmers

From the state we demand guaranteed prices for agricultural products, but such that they cover the costs of production; we demand an import-export and tax policy that protects domestic agricultural producers and, most of all, those who produce for the market. In order for the state to be capable of doing this, it must have an agrarian budget as well as a well-organized system of commodity reserves.

Land credit must be the main financial lever for expanding farm ownership; through the introduction of mortgage credits, the farmer would buy land on the basis of his existing land and house. Respecting the principle of equality, we demand that the preferential right to acquire farm property accorded to agricultural combines be abolished.

Buying machines for property of inadequate dimensions, the farmer becomes increasingly inferior, and this is why we support the abolition of the maximum limit on land holdings in order to expand farm ownership and in order to develop the small-farmer system of agriculture.

The farmer wants, and rightly so, to have his own organization with his own economic spirit, which will not be subject to any economic or political interests other than his own.

For: Prevention of "Ecological Genocide"

The citizen, in association with others who think the same way and joined together with them in whatever organizational structure—on the broad spectrum from a movement to an institution—desiring that the entire living planet survive the "ecological genocide" with which it is threatened due to polluted air, water, soil, and

food, desiring that he, his descendants, and his species, as well as the entire living planet survive, and that they survive unaltered:

- will unite at all ecological "black spots," in his community and throughout the planet, in order to ensure, through direct pressure on public opinion, defense of the living environment by undertaking all measures using the instruments of the rule-of-law state—from the codification of legal ordinances in those areas based on international standards, to the function of the judiciary and criminal prosecution of polluters, the suspension of their work, and compensation for damages, to levying taxes on profits and using them to protect the living environment;
- will exchange information, will announce it, will promote his activities in the media in order to shape ecological awareness and to exert the pressure of public opinion on institutions in the system;
- will join with all who are ready to unite behind this program, because pollution "does not recognize" the borders of federal entities, of the entire federation, or other political-territorial borders.

For: Health and a Chosen Alternative

There are numerous indicators of "criminal inactivity," social indifference towards serious consequences with regard to the health of our children, young people, and adults.

We promote an approach to health that will make it the precondition and means for an inventive life filled with work and creativity.

We promote the health-related problems of young people through the "Movement for Health," while pointing out the consequences of smoking tobacco and using other drugs, consuming alcohol, the risks of AIDS...

We support healthy food, sound housing, a healthy school and/or work environment, and in general healthy lifestyles.

We demand promotion of the entire health-care system, especially promotion of preventative activity, because there is no form of rehabilitation that can restore one's original condition.

In our commitment to health, we undertake collective and/or individual responsibility for promoting a new scenario for organizing life in which human health is near the top of the scale of a society's values.

For: Respect for the Rights of the Child and the Family

Through our focus on a free and humane society, our affirmation of basic human rights, respecting the dignity and worth of each human being, we demand execution of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which obligates all signatory states to take corresponding steps to ensure protection of the child and to create the conditions for his full and proper development.

We support respect for the rights of the child at play, as a basic precondition for a happy childhood, and we support prohibiting all forms of violence against children, especially prohibiting child abuse for political purposes.

Protection of the family's right to intimacy must be guaranteed, which includes all forms of discrimination and violence by its members.

We support the formation of a ministry for children and youth, whose role would be to provide special protection and help to children and families, affirming the child as a free individual and creating the conditions whereby the family, as the basic societal unit, can fully assume responsibility for its reproductive, protective, and educational role. Emphasizing our stand that family planning is the right, obligation, and responsibility of each person, and due to the need to alleviate the longstanding disruption in biological reproduction, we support the establishment of a procreational balance through implementing a consistent system of measures relating to population policy by the state.

For: Scientific Development and the Right to Education—One of the Basic Human Civil Rights

We demand that the rule-of-law state ensure for everyone the realization of the right to education at a particular level, that it guarantee the standardized execution of this public activity in the most underdeveloped and the most developed regions of the republic, but also that in some segments of education private educational institutions be founded, with equal authority and corresponding state control.

We demand a continual improvement in the quality of educational activity, from the computerization of the schools, computer "literacy," the study of programming languages, and the compulsory study of two foreign languages, to creating innovative instructional programs and eliminating "Marxism" and "national defense and social self-defense" as special subjects, to a complete transformation of the predominant concept of memorization into reasoning and critical and creative thinking.

Besides reforms in the way in which knowledge is acquired and verified, we support a different way for deciding on the subjects of the educational process. We demand autonomy for the universities, autonomy for student associations through the League of Students, and autonomy for teacher associations.

As a function of improving quality, we support scientific-educational communication with the world and communication within the country in which, instead of "validating" diplomas when one crosses republican or provincial borders, there is an easier flow of knowledge and ideas in science and education.

We demand that the state and economic subjects finance the higher education of the best people needed for development, while all others who freely choose their

faculty and enroll there without any restrictions whatsoever (aside from restrictions in the sense of "the threshold of knowledge") must do so predominantly at their own expense and risk, if at that time or later there is or will be no need on the market for the knowledge or skill that they have chosen to acquire.

We also demand that steps be taken—primarily through economic policy—to halt the emigration of the most capable scientific workers, that stable financing of fundamental research and the financing of test production for the sake of economically implementing newly won knowledge be ensured, and that schisms in scientific potential be healed, so that the combined scientific potential can be employed for development and the overall advancement of the economy and of society.

Basic Principles

The Social-Democratic Youth Alliance of Serbia (SDSMS) is an independent, democratic political organization in the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

The Social-Democratic Youth Alliance of Serbia, on the basis of free decisions by its members, is associated with organizations or alliances in Yugoslavia that have close program orientations.

The Social-Democratic Youth Alliance of Serbia may cooperate with kindred organizations and their associations in Europe and the rest of the world, consistently applying the principle of accountability only towards its own members.

The Social-Democratic Youth Alliance of Serbia restores the democratic tradition and ideal of the social-democratic movement in Serbia.

Presentation to the Public

On Wednesday, 21 February 1990, a press conference was held at the office of the district committee of the SSOS at which the draft statutes and program of the future Social-Democratic Youth Alliance of Serbia were presented to the public. Responding to questions by reporters from several newspapers, Dusko Todorovic, Radivoje Lazarevic, and Gordana Marjanovic, president and members of the Presidency of the district committee of the SSOS, emphasized that this Alliance will fight for parliamentary power under future conditions of pluralistic political life.

In the first phase, the public is presented with the draft versions of the basic documents for the future party; after tallying the results of public debate, these documents will be offered to the Congress for approval. Among other things, these documents state that membership in the future party will be individual and collective, that the Council of the SDSMS will be formed on the level of the republic and will coordinate the broadest social campaigns, and that the future party will act within the framework of the Youth League of Serbia.

Leader of Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia Interviewed

90BA0036A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
1 Apr 90 p 9

[Interview with the head of the Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia, Dr. Milorad Pupovac, by Branko Podgornik; place and date not given: "They Want To Reach an Agreement at the Expense of the Citizens"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] The president of the Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia [SDSH] contends that neither the nation nor the state brings happiness: It is contrary to democracy and social democracy to attempt to define and represent the interests of the citizens according to the political model of the Party (Milosevic), DEMOS, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], the Coalition, and others.

In recent months, social democracy has emerged in Croatia somewhat suddenly, in two versions. There are now two social democratic organizations. They are linked by a common ideal, but they are not working together—at least not for now.

Two months after the founding of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia by Dr. Antun Vujic, the Social Democratic Alliance of Yugoslavia (SDSJ) was founded in mid-February at a preliminary meeting in Zagreb. Then, on 26 February, also in Zagreb, the Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia was founded, which currently has 300 to 400 members in the republic. The latter group is led by Dr. Milorad Pupovac, 35, and is a component of the SDSJ, together with alliances of the same name that have been founded over the past month or so in nearly every republic and province. It is interesting that the Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia (as well as the Yugoslav group) has inspired several members of the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative [UJDI]. Even Pupovac is a member of the UJDI, in addition to occupying the post of chairman of the SDSH/SDSJ and lecturing for the Philosophy Faculty in Zagreb. Those people with long memories will recall how the members of the UJDI are largely a continuation of the contemplative circle of leftist intellectuals at the end of the 1960s, especially those centered around the journal PRAXIS. In recent years, the PRAXIS group has used several ideas from the movement of that "Croatian spring" in its arguments. Perhaps history is repeating itself, although with a little difference, in today's polemics within two wings of social democracy?

Interest of the Individual

[VJESNIK] What does your organization want?

[Pupovac] First of all, we want Yugoslavia to be structured as a political association of citizens that are equal in all regards and of republics that are equal in all regards. Thus, we want Yugoslavia to be structured as a democratic and federative state. The basis for this structure of Yugoslavia and for the democratic structure of its

republics can be first and foremost the interest of each individual. The interest, for example, that leads the entrepreneur to do business with another entrepreneur, regardless of whether he is a Serb, Croat, Slovene or anything else, and the interest that, for example, compels the worker to take a job, regardless of whether it is a Slovenian or Serbian company. Full autonomy must be accorded these and other interests. The only thing that is necessary is the republican and federal state that will guarantee their autonomy and equal rights. It is precisely in those states, as the heirs to bourgeois democracy and the representatives of social democracy, that we see the terms for democratization and the precondition for the sovereignty of the nations of people, and of the republics, and of Yugoslavia. Every other solution would be either undemocratic or less democratic than this one. Any attempt to limit the interest of each of us and the freedom of each of us on behalf of some imposed national or state—republican or federal, it's all the same thing—element is an enormous obstacle to the societal vitality and political democratization of both the Croatian and the Yugoslav state.

[VJESNIK] Does your republican alliance, of which you are the leader, have autonomy with respect to the federal organization?

[Pupovac] The SDSJ was organized as a federation of members of both republican and provincial organizations. This means that all members of the SDSJ, regardless of which republican or provincial organization they belong to, may participate in the overall organization. At the same time, this means that the republican and provincial organizations are autonomous in the organization and implementation of their activities. All the organizations of the SDSJ are freely associated in the joint organization, and they may freely leave it. Thus, the SDSJ has a flexible, democratic, federative internal organization, on the basis of that which it proposes as a solution for the structure of Yugoslavia. The governing bodies are its assembly, presidency, president, secretariat, secretary, and program committee.

[VJESNIK] What is the essential difference between your alliance and the Social Democratic Party of Croatia? As soon as you came into being, there were polemics. The Social Democratic Party of Croatia has accused you of being unitaristic, and you have accused them, if I am not mistaken, of being nationalistic?

[Pupovac] We have not accused the Social Democratic Party of Croatia of being nationalistic. That would have no meaning as a reason for a dispute within the ranks of social democracy. Generally speaking, serious political disputes cannot take place if they unfold on the level of stereotypes: unitaristic, nationalistic, separatist, etc. After we came into being, we emphasized two basic factors in which we differ from the Social Democratic Party of Croatia. Firstly, we think that democracy in general, and social democracy in particular, cannot be derived from something that is imposed on each individual in advance, which at this moment is the nation

and state (republic). We think, specifically, that it is contrary to democracy and social democracy to attempt to define and represent the interests of citizens, of members of individual nationalities, and or citizens of individual republics according to the political model of the Party (Milosevic), DEMOS, the HDZ, the Coalition, and others, as exclusively national or state interests. We think that neither the nation nor the state brings happiness for the human being if it does not take shape as an expression of his real social interest. Secondly, in keeping with this, we think that a political party, regardless of what kind, cannot represent the interests of the entire nation or state. But that is precisely what nearly all political organizations in Croatia and other republics are trying to do, including the Social Democratic Party of Croatia. A political party can represent a certain social interest, but not the interest of the entire society. This is what the Party tried to do. Now we can see how that has come to an end. Are the interest of those who live from their work, whom social democracy represents, and the interests of all others in Croatia so uniform that they can be articulated as one interest? Are the interests of the citizens of the republics of Yugoslavia so different and contradictory that they cannot be represented by political parties on any basis other than a national or republican one? In the projection of those who think that democracy is constructed through agreements between national and republican leaders—yes. In our plan, where we think that democracy is constructed through mediation between representatives of free interests of the citizens—no.

Impediments to Democratization

[VJESNIK] Who is the greatest threat to democratization in this country?

[Pupovac] At this moment, there are two main sources of a threat to the further democratization of Croatian and Yugoslav society. The first are the remnants of the League of Communists, and the second, which are gaining strength, are the rightist parties that are either presenting themselves as or acting like parties of national consent. The remnants of the League of Communists are a danger to democratization in various ways. On the one hand insofar as they want to impose the Bolshevik-Stalinist concept of politics—I am thinking here of the policies of Slobodan Milosevic and his hangers-on—on all of society, and on the other hand insofar as they link the reform of the communist party too tightly to the reform of the state and of society—I am thinking here of the so-called communist reformers. Specifically, a reform of whatever communist organization, federal or republican, should not be limited to questions of the sovereignty of the federal or republican state. And that is precisely what is happening. With regard to their real institutional power, it is possible that the process of democratization is being blocked from that side. A major danger to the further development of democratization is also represented by the aspirations of the groups, parties, and coalitions of so-called national consent that are being formed on the Right, the task of which would be to

attempt once again to shape Yugoslavia as a consenting cooperative. A state that would develop as "our" national and republican representatives agree on the basis of "our" fixed interests what kind of and how much of a democratic state we must live in. Naturally, a great danger to democratization is represented by the extreme political activity of the most right-wing political groups and organizations, which either long for incidents or incite them. And with certain symbols, these groups more or less wreck havoc throughout Croatia and Yugoslavia.

[VJESNIK] Do you think that this made itself felt at the recent meetings in Petrova Gora and Benkovac?

[Pupovac] Both the rally in Petrova Gora and the incident in Benkovac were expressions of the latter danger that I was talking about. The rally in Petrova Gora is part of an inappropriate and provocative political line, with which nothing but national mistrust is achieved on the one hand, and the spread of nationalistic, consensual politics on the other. Although we regard it as inappropriate, such politics should not be prohibited, since that is precisely the source of its strength. I regard the incident in Benkovac as part of that political approach, rally-oriented, nationally exclusive on both sides, and like the insane appearance of an individual who in the structured situation can serve as the match to spark clashes of incalculable proportions. Naturally, we are vehemently opposed to any political approach that would eliminate political differences through liquidation. At the same time, we are against the irresponsible wielding of power in these situations. Otherwise, in this same context, it would not be good for the syntagma "Kosovization of Croatia" in the sense of "exporting the antibureaucratic revolution" to actually gain a new meaning, namely that "Serbs in Croatia are the source of instability in Croatia." The politics and reporting in that direction are not good for either Croatia or Yugoslavia.

Croatian SDP Chairman Vujic Interviewed

90BA0035A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
1 Apr 90 p 9

[Interview with Dr. Antun Vujic, president of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia, by Branko Podgornik; date and place not given: "Dr. Antun Vujic: Let the Democratic Public Decide"]

[Text] Dr. Antun Vujic (44) is one of the initiators of the renewal of social democracy in Croatia. Although the Social Democratic Party of Croatia was established only three and one half months ago, it has become one of the competitors to be reckoned with in the political arena of Croatia during the election campaign, especially since it joined the National Compact Coalition. Vujic himself, as its president, has in a short time stepped from relative anonymity into the public spotlight. It is less well known that he is one of those people whose public activity was cut short at the same time that "Croatian spring" was

interdicted. Among other things he has during the meantime received his PhD and taken a job in the "Miroslav Krleza" Yugoslav Lexicography Institution.

[Podgornik] Is there anything in common between the ideas which you advocated then and those which you are advocating today?

[Vujic] There is, since both then and now I was trying to broaden the space of freedom. I was active in the youth organization and started the newspaper OMLADINSKI TJEDNIK. I am not one of those who ended up in prison, but one of those who for a number of years was unable to find employment and then unable to get anything published, not even technical papers. A period of re-Stalinization of Croatia ensued after the period of authentic democratic development that in 1979 culminated with all the side effects, not all of which were as happy as they might have been, but all of which seemed harmless today. In many respects, that was also an attempt at social democratic revision of communism, when Croatia remained alone, and its reform movement was crushed, just like in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the democratic changes today go much deeper. Many reform-oriented people of my generation thought at the time that we could have a pluralism which need not necessarily be multiparty pluralism. In time, it became clear that we would have fallen into a steel trap if we had not evolved to the present demand for multiparty parliamentary democracy.

[Podgornik] Was it out of a desire for personal satisfaction that you returned to politics after 19 years?

[Vujic] Not at all. It is a consequence of the protracted unsuccessful attempts to do something professionally in my job. I was one of the young scientists who could not fail to see how things around them were going to ruin. We drew up projects, we were patted on the shoulder, our projects were praised, but they never saw the light of day. It took us a long time, it seems, to realize that changes cannot be made overnight. The change of direction, the return to politics, is the result of the restricted social space for professional work, which is driving to despair those who want to do something and can do something.

A Scenario for Suspension of Democracy

[Podgornik] The other day, individuals from the top leadership of the new parties in Croatia called upon the Communists to speak out about what the government did, thinking probably of the period following 1971. Many of those who are now leaders in the new parties ended up in prison because their thinking was different. Should the Communists have apologized to them, to you, and to all non-Communists?

[Vujic] The question of apologies ought to be put differently. Some Communists must apologize to other Communists, together they should apologize to non-Communists, but actually it would be best to forget all that as soon as possible. It leads nowhere to go back to

the past. I know personally many people whose fate was so bitter as to be intolerable. They would have grounds for seeking every possible satisfaction. But even to them it is much more important today to open up the space of freedom for political and every other creative activity than to establish who was to blame. Certainly, a policy cannot be rewarded which created the intellectual prerequisite for inhumane actions. It would be good if the protagonists of that policy looked at themselves in the mirror before offering themselves to the public once again. Nevertheless, it is only criminal accountability that no one can escape. The rest belongs to our typical Croatian history of misfortunes. That is why the basic thing is to understand that the people who fared poorly do not expect satisfaction today, but they do expect to join the democratic forces and win the fight for the kind of relations in which something of that kind cannot occur again. That is the kind of satisfaction that is expected.

[Podgornik] At this point, who represents the greatest threat to the development of democracy in Croatia?

[Vujic] There is a threat to democracy in Croatia from the pattern of relations associated in part with the balance of power within Croatia and to a still greater extent to Croatia's position in Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia's position in this part of Europe and in the world. If the question requires a favorable or unfavorable assessment of the components of political forces in Croatia which some people see as a threat to democracy, then I must say that I would not agree so long as we are talking about the opposition. I feel, for instance, that the Croatian Democratic Community was created in an extremely unfavorable moment and when Croatia's position was extremely unfavorable. At that time, the official Croatian regime was totally ineffective in repelling the savage assaults on Croatia which are relevant even today. Only in part was the Croatian Democratic Community created by people from the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], while in part it was created by the authorities themselves with their anathemas. We cannot speak of what was created with defensive intentions as something which has dangerous intentions. I would never equate the HDZ with those for whom the alternative is precisely the HDZ. The issue of the HDZ and the issue of the coalition, which perhaps encompasses your question, can be decided only in a democratic procedure within Croatia. Let this be decided by Croatia's democratic public in the elections. Meanwhile, there are considerable dangers to Croatia. The potential sources of crises and danger are above all the hypertrophied paragonovernmental bodies and components of the apparatus which have the sense that democracy means that they are losing the basis for their privileged and untouchable position. Scenarios are being dreamed up as to how to bring about conditions in Croatia for suspending democracy. It is in that context that I would interpret the Benkovac case. Threats of suspending democracy throughout Yugoslavia are also constantly being maintained and generated in Kosovo. Of course,

democracy actually has been suspended because in one part of the country all elementary human rights and all civilized standards of politics are being brutally trampled on, and this senselessly maintains Yugoslavia's state of isolation from the normal world.

The Tendency To Criticize Those Who Are Weaker

[Podgornik] Which means there is no one in Croatia among the political forces that could have an adverse influence on the development of democracy?

[Vujic] To tell the truth, I have not been poking about in the "Croatian pot" for that purpose. I am speaking about political parties, not about individuals. There are always individuals who would set fire to the temple of Artemis. However, I do not see a single political party that would establish programs that ought to be interdicted by some "higher" criterion of the protection of democracy. I am convinced that I am not naive when I believe in the universal commitment of the Croatian public to democracy.

[Podgornik] Do you think that Ante Markovic's behavior can be compared to the behavior of the Fuehrer, as was recently done by one figure in the ranks of the opposition in Croatia?

[Vujic] Different people make different comparisons. The word fuehrer simply means leader, but the fuehrer also signifies what is odious to us all. The man who applied that term to Markovic did not have in mind a comparison with the latter. However, in Markovic's behavior, especially in his last statement to business people in Zagreb, there is something completely unacceptable to anyone who advocates democratic options. That is the belief that all democracy in Yugoslavia originates in his goodwill to offer it to us. This is particularly unacceptable when we take into account that a number of elements of his reform are actually dual—not only subject to criticism, but also refutable by criticism, as we in fact have written in our paper. Looking at his program from the political standpoint, I would like to say that it failed on the basic point—the issue of the functioning of the market in Yugoslavia on the basis of an aggressive economic boycott of one federal unit by another one. The continuous attempt of the government to strike a stance somewhere in between, with even a tendency to criticize those who are not guilty, but who are mistakenly thought to be weaker, shows that the government is more and more losing that necessary scrupulousness necessary for people to believe that it can do something. Resorting to centralism, which is now becoming evident, is only an expression of inability to turn toward the true source of the crisis—the apparatus for the production of centralism.

Accentuation of Identity, Not Autonomy

[Podgornik] Some people are saying that the Serbs in Croatia are privileged. What do you think?

[Vujic] I do not think that the Serbs in Croatia are privileged. They are in just the same bad situation as the Croats. What gives the impression of their being privileged, when one looks at the statistical representation of Serbs in certain social services, is at the same time harmful to both Croats and the Serbian nationality in Croatia. We do not feel that the Serbs are simply some ethnic minority as compared to the Croats. The Croats and Serbs are bound together in Croatia by long-lasting ties, blood ties, and also bloody ties, but also by common struggles and desires for achievement of a free common homeland. Whoever talks about the Serbs from the standpoint of narrow-minded Croatian chauvinism is forgetting the Serbian traditions that go all the way back to the Borojevices, the traditions of those Serbs who have not only seen Croatia as their homeland, but in fact have affirmed and defended it as such. Those traditions are still alive, and I believe that when this epidemic is over, the Serbian nationality will go back to them. So it is not only the Serbs, but also the Croats, who are responsible. At the same time, it is quite clear that Croatia can be defined not only as the state of all its citizens, but also the national state of the Croatian people, because this is a historical debt to that nationality, which has never fully been able to have the feeling of satisfaction concerning that legitimate need which it has. That kind of Croatia is today waiting at the door, and the door must be opened. However, the nationality question, in the opinion of the Social Democrats, is not the issue that stands above all others. It exists wherever it has not been resolved, and where the nationality question has not been resolved, the issue of man and his freedom has not been resolved either. That is the thesis which we are defending in Croatia and Yugoslavia. We reject all discussion about geographic political autonomy. But we feel that a strengthening of the ethnic institutions of the Serbs in Croatia is not the right solely of the Serbian people in Croatia, but also a task of Croats, who should not only make it possible for them to exercise that right, but in fact encourage it. We believe that relations in Croatia, not only between Croats and Serbs, but also when other nationalities are involved, can be worked out soundly by encouraging all cultural, social, and other structural elements of their national identity. Social democracy is suitable for that kind of organization of the state in which the specific aspects of regions will come into play. We have defined the Croatian homeland as a homeland of diversity and totality. We feel that social democracy can nurture those particular qualities in which differences will not be harmful to its totality, but on the other hand will enrich the entirety of multicultural and multinational life in Croatia. But the historical aspiration of Croats for a free state, which has been brought about so many times in paper, must finally be fulfilled in reality.

The Genesis of a Party

[Podgornik] How do you explain the fact that recently you were joined on the political scene of the republic by

another party with similar profile—the Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia, as a component of the SDS [Social Democratic Party] of Yugoslavia? The public learned of this when the old and new organizations of Social Democrats reproached one another for “unitarism” and “nationalism.”

[Vujic] You said that this was a party of similar profile. It is not similar to our party either in profile or en face. The very genesis of that party is characteristic of the political voyage of all those who have not arrived at a straightforward position as to how democracy in general can be advanced. As the gentlemen in that party say themselves, they originated in the UJDI [Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative], and we also know where the UJDI came from, so that when we speak about the opposition in Croatia, we are usually talking also about an opposition within the opposition and about an “opposition in power.” The Social Democratic Party of Croatia also took a clear position concerning Croatia by its presence in the coalition. The Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia was formed in such a fashion that, although it is called both the Croatian and Yugoslav alliance as the occasion requires, it did not even notify the Social Democratic Party of Croatia about its formation. This is that type of Yugoslavism which immediately buys a hat to cover empty heads if it finds them. This is a case of reviving the communist central committees, which at this point even the Communists are abandoning, but their mandarin children want to bring them back to us—so that we could once again have something like the congresses in Vukovar. This last one of theirs is a sufficient lecture for us.

But our opinions in this regard are also shared by the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia and the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo and the one in Montenegro, and it seems to me certain others as well, and they soon will be making an announcement in this connection. The place of Croatian Social Democracy is in its people. Presumably, the members of that organization “in the process of being established” will know what the place of the “Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia is as a part of the Social Democratic Alliance of Yugoslavia (in the process of being established).” In the meantime, the baby has been born, it has been christened with our abbreviation (SDSH), and since a baby has to have a mama, it will also be establishing an SDSJ.

[Podgornik] Will the National Compact Coalition win in the elections?

[Vujic] I think it will. As for the composition of the new Croatian Assembly, we can assume that there will be considerable changes in the configuration of the parties. Some parties, precisely those larger ones, at this point resemble more movements than parties. In our assessment, they contain a rather wide diversity of political outlooks. Indeed, even the party in power is facing an extensive restructuring. Social democracy has decided in that context to set itself up as a party which will have a long life and not run out of breath. We are one of the very

few parties to insist on our political profile, including economic and social. We think that we hold the position of the left center, whose role must grow regardless of these elections. In Europe today, the group of Social Democratic and similar parties account for about 40 percent of the vote. The need for the Social Democratic option will increase as ethnic tensions in Croatia are resolved. Even now we want to contribute to resolving ethnic tensions by pointing out a specific strategy for doing this. We believe that we are a party of the future.

[Podgornik] Has the National Compact Coalition already formed its future government?

[Vujic] No. Not as far as I know, and I presumably would have been aware. At this moment, I think it would be premature and even frivolous to establish some republic government. We first have to win the elections. Of course, it is possible to speak about the type of government that is desirable. The type of government, as the Social Democrats see it, ought to satisfy several criteria. First, young and able people, perhaps even people who are not well known, but who have proven their abilities. Second, people devoted to democracy, and people whose devotion to democracy the public believes in. Third, that government must also take into account Croatia's position in Yugoslavia and the world and bring about prerequisites for the international prestige of a democratic solution in Croatia. I think that that government must not evade the responsibility of Croatia for democratic development in Yugoslavia as a whole, but the possibility should be opened up for Croatia not to be bound by retrograde arrangements and the mortgages of a policy which is now being imposed on Yugoslavia.

Kosovo Problem Traced to 1966 Brioni Plenum

90EB0345A Belgrade *POLITIKA* in Serbo-Croatian
7 Mar 90 p 15

[Article by Batric Jovanovic: "The Albanization of Kosovo Supported by an Anti-Serbian Coalition"]

[Text] In connection with the recent mass terrorist violence by Albanian separatists involving numerous armed assaults on public order agencies, the leaders of Slovenia and Croatia responded by condemning the Serbian policy in Kosovo and by calling for dialogue with the Albanian terrorists, something that is nothing but fifth column support for the Albanian separatist movement, whose aim is establishment of a "Greater Albania," on the ruins of Yugoslavia.

Public newspapers in Croatia and Slovenia are shedding crocodile tears over the fate of the Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo, even though Albanians make up the vast majority of the members of all Kosovo and Metohija delegations to Federal bodies and of all governmental, economic, scientific, educational, and cultural agencies and organizations in Kosovo, as well as the organs of sociopolitical organizations.

The only exceptions are the communities of Leposavic and Zubin Potok, in which Serbs and Montenegrins are in the majority, and the community of Kosovo Polje, in which Serbs and Montenegrins make up half the population. Signs in Kosovo are printed first in Albanian and then in Serbo-Croatian. Everyone who cares about the truth must conclude on the basis of these indisputable facts that the majority Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo has hegemonistic status, while the minority peoples and ethnic groups—Serbs, Montenegrins, Moslems, Turks, and others—are in a subordinate position.

How the Separatists Became Democrats

The leaders of Slovenia and Croatia identify the Albanian separatist movement with the will of the Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo, although at a recent meeting of the 46th session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva it was concluded that the political parties of members of the Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo must "distance themselves from the Stalinist regime in Albania" and "eliminate any attempt at Albanization of integral Serbian and Yugoslav territory" from their programs "for the purpose of creating yet another Albanian state in the Balkans."

The Slovene and Croatian leaders support the "alternative" organizations of Kosovo, which are a "legal" form of action by the separatist movement. They sing the praises in particular of the "Democratic League of Kosovo" headed by Ibrahim Rugova, president of the ethnically pure Kosovo Writers' Association, who in interviews with foreign newspapers openly preaches armed uprising by the Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo against Serbia. People are put in prison in all legal states for such calls. Rugova and other leaders of the Kosovo and Metohija "alternative" are given the opportunity by Croatia and Slovenia to make anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav declarations abroad.

Ibrahim Rugova recently held a press conference in Ljubljana at which he told notorious lies about the position of the Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo and Metohija. At the same time, the Slovene authorities prevented the holding of a meeting in Ljubljana by Serbs and Montenegrins who live in Slovenia, but allowed this meeting to be held in Kranj, except that the participants were forbidden to mention Kosovo!?

It is continually trumpeted in Croatia and Slovenia that the current turbulent situation in Kosovo and Metohija is "proof of the failure of Serbian policy" in Kosovo, that "Serbia has taken power in Kosovo but is not able to put the situation in order." That this is insolent deception of the uninformed is proved by the following facts. (1) The most prominent politicians in Croatia and Slovenia for decades shaped Yugoslavia's policy toward Kosovo and Metohija enabling Albanian separatists to terrorize Serbs and Montenegrins, to drive them out of the province, and thus to carry out Albanization of Kosovo and Metohija; (2) Serbia established, formally, its most elementary state power in Kosovo less than a year ago, that

is, when the Albanian separatists had already accomplished the lion's share of their "ethnically pure Kosovo" program, and when the greater part of the Albanian ethnic group, as a result of the untruthful propaganda by the Albanian separatists, and that from Tirana, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, and to some extent from Sarajevo, was incited to reject the legally established government of Serbia throughout its territory; and (3) in the past, since the time of constitutional establishment of the republic, Serbia has not done much to consolidate the situation in Kosovo because of the open support for the Albanian separatists, which has come and is coming from Croatia and Slovenia, and to some extent also from Bosnia and Hercegovina.

No objective person can deny the fact that everything taking place in Kosovo, including the escalation of terrorist activities by the Albanian separatists and chauvinists, is primarily the result of the anti-Serbian policy of Yugoslav leaders inaugurated at the Brioni plenum of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Central Committee in July 1966.

After the Brioni plenum the country was ruled by a triumvirate made up of Tito, Kardelj, and Bakaric. It is true that Vladimir Bakaric stated after Tito's death that he was not a "close coworker of Comrade Tito." However, the facts refute Bakaric. It is known that Bakaric had the privilege of speaking even more frankly than Tito himself about the most important events in the country. The Brioni plenum was devoted exclusively to the abuses in the State Security Service. Shortly after the plenum, however, Bakaric stated that the chief purpose of the Brioni plenum was "settling of scores with Serbian chauvinism." Bakaric's statement doubtlessly reveals the actual aims of the chief directors of the Brioni plenum. In view of the fact that there was not a single mention of "Serbian chauvinism" during the plenum, it is clear that Bakaric's story was merely a smokescreen concealing the treacherous aim of breaking up Serbia. This plan was carried out in two stages. The first began at the 9th LCY Congress in 1969, when the leagues of communists of the provinces in effect were separated from the League of Communists of Serbia, and the second with the 20th amendment to the Yugoslav Constitution of 30 June 1971, whereby the provinces were actually separated from Serbia. The proponents of the breaking up of Serbia had as their immediate goal faster development of Croatia and Slovenia through exploitation of Serbia and the other republics.

The responsibility for the Albanization of Kosovo and Metohija and the great sufferings of the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs and Montenegrins has been borne since 1966 in particular by the top leaders of the country, that is, the triumvirate we have named. Here is proof of this statement.

Highest Positions for Members of the "Djakovic Group"

The first piece of evidence is that immediately after the Brioni plenum a unique anti-Serbian, and accordingly

anti-Yugoslav, revolution sponsored by the top leaders of the country was carried out in Kosovo and Metohija, so that Albanian chauvinist ideologues headed by Fadilj Hodza came into power. Albanian chauvinists and persons of anti-Serbian orientation were placed in leading positions in State and public security, in the courts, public prosecutor's offices, in education, and in scientific and cultural institutions. All the most important positions in Kosovo were obtained by members of the "Djakovic group," that is, persons who emigrated to Albania between the wars, and as such were thoroughly prepared to fight by all means for "Greater Albania." And so the foundation was laid for reactivation of the old racist "ethnically pure Kosovo" program.

The second piece of evidence is this. Although the chairman of the Constitutional Commission of the Assembly of Kosovo and Metohija, Fadilj Hodza, stated at the Commission's meeting in October 1988 that "while we say that the SFRY is made up of six republics and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which are part of Serbia, others believe that they are federal units rather than autonomous provinces," and that "the Federation will approve nothing without the consent of Serbia." However, by the decision of Tito, Kardelj, and Bakaric, a statement was included in the 20th amendment referred to reading that the SFRY is made up of six republics and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which are part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The identical wording was incorporated into the 1974 Constitution.

At the time of the writing and adoption of the 20th amendment, the president of the Assembly of Serbia was Draza Markovic, and the chairman of the League of Communists of Serbia Central Committee Marko Nikezic. At the time Nikezic was out of favor with Tito. Insofar as is known to this writer, the first conflict arose when Nikezic rejected Tito's demand that Serbia continue to refuse the enormous amount of money at prepaid interest for development of tourism, something that benefited mainly Croatia. With the assistance of Petar Stambolic and Draza Markovic, Tito highhandedly removed Nikezic, in 1972. At that time Markovic and Stambolic were in effect a factional group in the League of Communists of Serbia, and from the viewpoint of Serbia's interests fifth columnists.

Given the Green Light for Their Work

Through the actual separation of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo from Serbia, the Albanian separatists were given the green light to engage in psychological and physical terror against the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo and Metohija, a terror that by United Nations standards is of the nature of genocide. This terror drove Serbs and Montenegrins to abandon their age-old homesteads, and it, along with the encouragement of the fantastic birth rate of the Albanian ethnic group, forcibly brought about almost complete change in the ethnic map of Kosovo and Metohija.

The third item is that in 1968 Dobrica Cosic, a member of the League of Communists of Serbia Central Committee, and in 1971 and 1972 Milos Sekulovic and Jovo Sotra, members of the Kosovo League of Communists Provincial Committee, spoke up against the Albanian nationalist hegemonism and the chauvinistic violence against the Serbian and Montenegrin population of Kosovo and Metohija. Sotra wrote a thoroughly documented letter on the Kosovo situation, addressing it to Tito and his closest coworkers. But neither Tito nor any of the other leaders of the country cared about these cries from the darkness of Kosovo and Metohija.

Moreover, Cosic, Sotra, and Sekulovic were punished as "Serbian chauvinist nationalists," and Fadilj Hodza convinced (!) the leaders of the country, headed by Tito, that far-ranging cooperation between Kosovo and Albania would change the social essence of Enver's state. However, this did not happen, as was to be expected, and Enver's emissaries and agents and their comrades in Kosovo and Metohija carried out anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav indoctrination of the Albanian ethnic group in the province. Fadilj Hodza then remained in the driver's seat even when the other leaders of the Zagreb-Pristina-Skopje axis had to be replaced. The anti-Serbian coalition took him under its powerful wing so as to continue the intensive deserbization of Kosovo and Metohija.

Bakaric Saves Fadilj Hodza

Fourthly, when, after the anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav uprising by Albanian separatists and chauvinists in the spring of 1981, the black veil was finally lifted from the tragic reality of Kosovo, and when the truth began to be published about the 15-year tragedy of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo and Metohija, Vladimir Bakaric stated in July 1981 that the fact that misdeeds of the Albanian separatists was being revealed was "upsetting to Albanians" and "inflaming anti-Albanian attitudes." Hence Bakaric identified the Albanian separatists with the Albanian nationality. He did precisely what the Albanian separatists have been doing without interruption. As a result of Bakaric's commitment, the chief figures in the treacherous policy in Kosovo and Metohija are headed by Fadilj Hodza. The rest have remained beyond reach, but hundreds upon hundreds of indoctrinated young Albanians have been sent to prison for several years, and it would have been more humane and just for it to have been the other way round. Bakaric took into account, of course, the fact that Fadilj Hodza's policy has the full support of the country's highest leaders.

At the end of 1981 Bakaric stated that Serbia had "not yet managed to create a practical platform for cooperation with the autonomous provinces, but that we [would] see how this matter [would] develop further." These words were spoken by the man who at the time was the most powerful person in the country, one who took part in the shameful decision to reduce Serbia to a territory slightly larger than that of the old Belgrade Pashadom. Of course, this decision was harmful not just to Serbia and the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples but to Yugoslavia as a whole. Hence those who made this decision betrayed the country.

After the death of the third member of the triumvirate, Bakaric, their faithful followers came onto the scene: Vrhovec, Suvar, Ribicic Senior, Dolanc, Kucan, Racan, Ribicic Junior, and their clique of Dragosavac, Krunic, and others. For years these people worked to maintain the status quo in Kosovo, that is, to continue the Albanization of the province. This surely is the main reason why all the measures taken by federal authorities in Kosovo have been either too late or ineffective.

The anti-Serbian coalition did not succeed in preventing constitutional establishment of Serbia over its entire territory, thanks to the nationwide support for the leaders of Serbia. On the other hand, the coalition did incite the Albanian terrorists to carry out terrorist acts and armed rebellion.

The Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo must clearly see the actual intentions of the false preachers in Croatia and Slovenia and must grasp the following three essential points:

- (1) the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples will never, at any cost, allow the separation of Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia and Yugoslavia;
- (2) their hypocritical allies are far off, these "allies" care about the Albanians solely and exclusively as a means of hostile action against Serbia, the reality is that their closest neighbors are the Serbian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian peoples, and it is in the best interests of the Albanian ethnic group to live in peace and friendship with these peoples; and
- (3) the only harm done in restoring to Serbia the elementary governmental authority taken away from it, from the viewpoint of the province as it is constituted, is to the Albanian separatists and terrorists; such restoration does not represent an attack against the real equality and all-round development of the Albanian ethnic group in Serbia and Yugoslavia.

HUNGARY

Details of Debrecen Soviet Airfield Negotiation Controversy**Substance of Dispute, Ownership Issues**

25000707F Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
17 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by the NEPSZABADSAG country reporter: "Some Fog Surrounds the Debrecen Airfield; Who Has the Key to the Archives?"]

[Text] With the passage of time the picture of the Debrecen Soviet military airfield becomes more blurred. No less is at stake than the issue of who owes whom and how much. The Soviet claim for damages related to troop withdrawals are groundless if the airfield site and establishments constitute Hungarian property. On the other hand, we would have to pay if the situation is the opposite; moreover, we would have to make payments in hard currency based on a new interstate agreement. Investigations thus far appear to support the idea of protecting Hungarian property, with particular attention paid to government decree No. 57/54, according to which our Ministry of Defense paid for the long-term Soviet investments in Hungary.

Confusion still persists with regard to documents referred to by Retired Colonel Jozsef Andriko the other day. These documents have not yet surfaced. According to a statement made by Sandor Nagy, the local secretary of the Association of Political Prisoners [POFOSZ], the former chief officer promised generals on active duty that he would make available to the people of Debrecen the invoices which they would not have been able to pay to enterprises in those days without his signature.

Accordingly, this rather complex situation must be clarified. The Hungarian-Soviet military expert committee was supposed to meet on Sunday for this purpose, but in the end the meeting did not take place. We learned this much: Today they are holding a conference at city hall with the participation of representatives of several parties. At that meeting a Ministry of Defense representative will inform the interested persons, public excluded, according to rumors.

Accordingly, we have to wait for the final settlement of this matter. Lukacs Szabo, a member of the presidium of the city's Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] organization, had this to say to our reporter:

[Szabo] "In the recent past I myself have searched for the files with no success. But they must exist somewhere. It's not even good to think about this: Immediately prior to the elections the troop withdrawal agreement was consummated in such a way that the issue of ownership rights was not clarified. And we do not even dare to assume that the reason why it is so difficult to find these documents is because government decree No. 54/57 may

have a secret clause which provides something other than what the basic law provides."

Accordingly, the key to the symbolic archives is not in the hands of the people of Debrecen. What we know for sure: This week the transfer of Debrecen Airfield begins.

On the other hand, the prompt clarification of this matter would be in the interest of both sides.

Search for Missing Documents Continues

25000707F Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
18 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by R. T. J.: "Democratic Muzzle in Debrecen"]

[Text] A conference was held yesterday at Debrecen city hall concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

On behalf of the interministerial committee concerned with Soviet troop withdrawal, Colonel Engineer Imre Mentés informed representatives of the council and of parties (according to the list of those actually invited: Deputy Council Chairman Gyula Kortvelyesi and representatives of the parties within the Democratic Roundtable, the successor organization to the Debrecen Opposition Roundtable). According to the communique issued, promised that party representatives may participate in the workings of the expert group charged with the transfer of the airfield [as published]. The essence of the rest of the communique is that issues pertaining to finances and cooperation with Soviet troops stationed in Hungary prior to 1956 must still be explored, while, as far as the rest is concerned, both parties have documents and invoices [as published]. These, so it says, "contain certain discrepancies, and their definition can be accomplished only at the national level."

In denying that the transfer of the airport would begin this week, the rest of the communique condemns the press and this newspaper. As it turns out, what is about to begin is only a survey of the site to which local representatives of parties will be invited. The next segment of the communique argues with statements made in the article, and makes reference to the fact that our article also dealt with ownership rights. By fundamentally not denying anything, the communique underscores the fact that ownership in Debrecen alone will not determine who owes what to whom. In conclusion Mentés stressed that the interministerial committee will continue to perform its function responsibly in the future, and requested the patience and preparedness of those present to cooperate, considering the diverse and complex nature of the committee's work.

Responding to our report from yesterday, a significant part of the Debrecen press appeared at city hall, nevertheless what we predicted came true: The meeting was closed. The holding of a closed meeting was based on a formal motion made by Kortvelyesi. Representatives of the democratic parties did not object to the motion. Journalists were told to return at 1100 hours for a press

release. The press release was delayed, however, because as it turned out that a Defense Ministry office would forward by telefax Mentès' statement as it was reconciled with representatives of the democratic parties. At last the statement arrived after 1130 hours. At that point the negotiating parties once again went into a closed session. A debate ensued concerning the document, which was espoused by the negotiating parties later.

The NEPSZABADSAG reporter asked Mentès about the results of the Debrecen conference.

[Mentès] "The Defense Ministry requested that the professional part of this matter be left to professionals. An agreement was reached regarding the fact that there is no separate Debrecen solution. For this reason we requested that local issues related to troop withdrawal not be debated in the press, because this would only make the workings of the negotiating committee authorized by the government more difficult."

Lukacs Szabo, presidium member of the Debrecen organization of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]:

[Szabo] "Unquestionably, the matter concerning the Debrecen airfield could come to the forefront to this extent only with the help of publicity. At this point, however, debate concerning complex details will follow. Since both parties may have trump cards, we must watch indeed not to deteriorate our own negotiating positions."

YUGOSLAVIA

Commander of Pristina Army Corps Interviewed

90EB0326A Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 90 pp 8-10

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel General Andrija Silic, Pristina Army Corps Commander; place and date not given: "We Are Fully Ready and Reliable"—first two paragraphs are NARODNA ARMIJA introduction]

[Text] Ongoing action by Albanian nationalists and separatists against SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], escalation of violence, and massive use of weapons. There can be no dialogue with persons trying to reach their goals by sighting along a gun barrel. We train the men to direct their weapons, hearts, and minds only against the enemies of our country and of our peoples and ethnic groups. There is no reason to worry about the life and health of the enlisted men and officers in Kosovo.

We naturally began our interview with the commander with an evaluation of the current situation in the area in which the units he commands live and work.

[Silic] The situation in Kosovo that we are experiencing intensively these days is the consequence of a long period of action by nationalists and separatists in this area. There is a continuity in their actions that is adapted to overall social developments, and when they believe that

the time is ripe for them they use the opportunity to appear in the public eye in various ways.

What is now happening throughout Kosovo is surely much more dramatic, destructive, and I would say better organized and executed than previously. The heart of the matter lies in the effort by the Albanian separatist movement to create an ethnically pure Kosovo, take over power from the legal authorities, and create a Republic of Kosovo and ultimately a so-called Greater Albania. In these strategic decisions of theirs the Albanian nationalists have merely changed their tactics, but the essential nature of their action has never changed. It is certain that the current economic and social situation in Yugoslavia, which is marked by a profound crisis, suits their purposes the best, and they have made presence known in the most drastic and harshest manner precisely by exploiting this opportunity.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Being here in the position of corps commander, you have been so to speak at the epicenter of the dramatic events in Kosovo for a year and a half, and we would like to hear of your experience in this ongoing situation and this recent escalation.

[Silic] In contrast to the past, January 1990 was marked by new characteristics in the action by the nationalists and separatists. The nationalists and separatists are adapting the tactics of their action to the context of overall social developments—the profound crisis, the appearance on the public stage of alternative movements and other structures that want to engage in the struggle for power. The basic feature of this period, in contrast to all earlier ones, is that a large number of peasants is appearing and rallying for the first time. When we add to this the participation by workers in strikes and the inactivity in labor organizations, the emergence of part of the young people and students, and the demands that they presented loudly and clearly on 24 January to the Provincial Committee of the Kosovo League of Communists, we find it certain that they wanted to tell both the Yugoslav and the world public that it is not merely a question of action by nationalists and separatists and counterrevolutionary forces, but rather that what is asserting itself in Kosovo is organized demand by the people, of the broadest masses of people, who in this way are allegedly fighting for their rights, their freedom, and democracy.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] May we say that, along with the larger scale of participation, one of the characteristics of the current demonstrations is greater use of force, and especially use of weapons?

[Silic] Current events are characterized above all by the large number of participants in demonstrations led by well organized and qualified persons who skilfully direct all activities, in accordance with a precisely drafted scenario and programs and methods of action. This period is marked by the great brutality displayed in the merciless settling of scores with members of the security forces, in addition to fairly extensive use of weapons,

ones of all types I might add. Thus, the nationalists and separatists have forced people to build barricades to prevent the security forces from intervening wherever they have asserted themselves and assembled most violently.

All this brutality is most clearly demonstrated in the broad area of Podujev and Suva Reka, where the actions of the nationalists and separatists have been the most violent. In view of all this, there has been no lack of victims; they have been inevitable under the conditions which the nationalists and separatists have created and considering what they have demanded. Nor should we overlook the many false accusations by means of which they have tried to spill blood in order to turn the people against the legal institutions of the system, against the security agencies; there have been many examples of this. On these occasions as well it has been confirmed that the nationalists and separatists do not spare human life, which to them is merely a means of reaching their goals. They have appeared over a wide area and on a rather large scale, with the aim of scattering the security forces in as many directions as possible and over as large an area as possible, confident that there are not enough of these forces to cope with them.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] How would you evaluate the living conditions and results of operation of the units of the Corps in 1989 in a report to higher headquarters?

[Silic] We have based our entire work on the programs and missions deriving from our obligations at the level of qualification of enlisted men and officers, units, and headquarters for accomplishment of our specific missions. On the whole, all the activities of our units and headquarters have been aimed at achievement of a high level of combat readiness, this being one of the fundamental missions, and qualification of all our structures to be able to perform successfully all the missions that lie ahead of us. Life and work in Kosovo and operation under the state of emergency that is partly already in force have certain special features. As long as the state of emergency exists in this area, it will be normal for our overall behavior and employment to be adjusted to it. It is quite clear that the actions of the Albanian nationalists and separatists have also been aimed at targets in the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. Accordingly, in addition to our basic and what I would term regular missions, we have had to take steps to protect our personnel and installations. One of our missions has been continual monitoring of this situation in the Kosovo area so as to be able to act accordingly, to the extent required to perform our function and missions.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] It is a matter of doctrine that interpersonal relationships are an essential factor in combat readiness. What comment would you add in the current situation?

[Silic] I would like here to point out one, in my opinion the most important, matter in development of combat readiness. It is work with people and creation of military

collectives. Our army environment is a special one in many respects, and particularly in that there are members of all the Yugoslav peoples and ethnic groups in our ranks. In this situation of Yugoslav crisis, everything that characterizes the individual regions, the individual structures of our population, all this is brought into our ranks with these young people. Consequently, we have the extremely great obligation and mission, regardless of what people bring with them into the JNA, to exert an influence in day-to-day work with them, education, training, political work, and information activities, influence so that these differences will not be a reason for these young persons to feel otherwise than Yugoslav, to have goals other than the Yugoslav ones. They tell us honestly that they arrived in the Army with many convictions that life is different in the Army, and not just as regards the hard work that they perform, but also because of the various burdens that were placed on them before they came into the Army: that they should associate only with their fellow countrymen, with persons who speak the same language, and so forth. As they become familiar with life and work in the Army, these young people themselves become convinced that what was told to them in various environments is not correct. What is done in the Army above all is to develop the personality, the individual, a person who will be able himself to evaluate the events taking place around him and to commit himself consciously to carrying out the missions of defense.

In addition to the military technical qualification missions, we have constantly taught them to respect each other and help each other, to associate with and get to know each other, and in this way gain confidence in each other, as well as to take with them from the army everything that they receive here and manage to instill into themselves as young individuals and to work with it later in society. When we surveyed the status of interpersonal relationships in our environment, in view of its heterogeneous makeup we came to the conclusion that young people are less burdened with nationalism than is alleged in many quarters. Indeed, there are persons with definite convictions and burdens; we cannot say that there are no individuals who think differently. However, the vast majority are free of nationalist burdens. We have worked directly with them precisely on this problem and have built up military communities. At this moment I can say quite seriously that one of our greatest values is that, despite the profound social crisis, the disturbances, and the undermining of interethnic relationships in our country, and especially in Kosovo, we have no manifestations of nationalism and all that would disunite us in our environment. Precisely such unity is a guarantee that we are ready and able, as is also confirmed by our results, to perform any mission based on dedication to Yugoslavia.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] We gather from this, Comrade General, that your regular evaluation of political morale in the Corps that you are currently analyzing will be a high one.

[Silic] The political morale is best to be evaluated by observing the everyday work and behavior of our men. In any event, as is demonstrated by all analyses and evaluations, the morale will be high. But I would like to say something more about the building of interpersonal and interethnic relationships, because I believe this to be a crucial question. Above all because of the fact that we live and, as part of the armed forces, operate in an area in which interethnic relationships are deeply disturbed, and precisely at this level at that, by building good interpersonal relationships and confidence in our environment, we can also exert a certain amount of influence on the social environment. In view of the fact that we build our units to be strong, unified, and decisive ones, we have both the right and the duty to operate in this multiethnic environment, primarily in direct work with people as Yugoslav oriented and not burdened with nationalism. In considering the question of interethnic relationships, time and again the question will arise here of what to do to bring people of different ethnic groups, above all Albanians and all others, closer together and to instill confidence, because we are all keenly aware that only good interethnic relationships in such an environment can guarantee that things will get better for all of us. I point this out because the JNA, on the basis of its social essence and everything that it does in its environment, in creating brotherhood and unity, has much that it can impart to its surroundings. We are doing this in various ways. There are many contacts between our personnel and young people, in projects and cultural events and in joint visits to Army Homes. Military personnel go to schools and labor organizations. I would like in particular to point out our solemn obligations that have become nationwide events, in which military personnel, parents from all areas of the country, and local residents gather to participate in joint ceremonies. Our personnel render great assistance to the population when it is threatened by natural disasters. We do the most in areas where the infrastructure is the least developed. By bringing cultural benefits and the benefits of civilization closer to the people of these regions, we try to help develop the electric power distribution network and the postal, telephone, and telegraph network, and build facilities for watching television programs.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] The advantages of direct, daily, and painstaking work with individuals, of cooperation with the people, are possibly expressed nowhere as clearly as in Kosovo.

[Silic] We do our work in the form of direct, almost daily, contact with ordinary people in local associations, schools, and labor organizations. The greatest value of this work is that it is done continually, directly, and in connection with vital questions.

What I am saying is not just our judgment. You can also ask the people with whom we work, associate, and build trust. Because of this relationship and the army's mode of operation in this environment, we as members of the Corps believe that we earned high trust among all the peoples and ethnic groups. I stress the words "among all"

so that it will not be thought that we have gained the confidence exclusively of the non-Albanian population. We also have the trust of a large number of Albanians, for whom the Army is a guarantor of our freedom and independence, and persons are together in the army who do not classify peoples by ethnic groups but on the basis of other, more universal criteria.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] May we move on to a somewhat different area, that of the role of the Corps' units in calming down the situation in Kosovo?

[Silic] When speaking of the current situation in Kosovo, we members of the JNA also point out that the situation is very difficult and complex, even dramatic. The drama of this situation is reflected above all in the barbarism of the nationalists and separatists, their efforts to influence the members of other peoples and ethnic groups in the most insolent manner, but a part of the Albanian population as well, to frighten them and to force others to emigrate from this area as soon as possible. This is their ultimate goal. At one point the people asked why JNA units did not come into the picture. It is well known that under the Constitution the Supreme Command, that is, the Presidency of the SFRY, decides if and when JNA units will be employed under such conditions. In this case it took several days to make such a decision, but we were nevertheless ready and able at all times to carry out our missions, above all to prevent these interethnic conflicts and bloodshed. At the time when this decision was made, members of the JNA carried out missions in various areas, in a very large number of places in Kosovo, and especially wherever the Albanian nationalists and separatists appeared and operated. Accordingly, our participation there was no accident; we moved to the places where human freedom and lives were in the greatest danger. Observing the political security situation and the behavior of the nationalists and separatists, we concentrated all our activities precisely in those areas and places. And so we were ready at all times to protect all persons, Albanians and others as well as Serbs and Montenegrins.

Our presence along routes of communication and in towns and villages served primarily to make it plain to the nationalists and separatists that as an institution of the system based on the Constitution we have the duty of protecting freedom and integrity and of preventing separation of this part of the country from Yugoslavia, to make it abundantly clear to all of them that they will not succeed in their dishonorable designs. The army is here and is ready, able, and determined to thwart them. The appearance of the army outside the barracks encouraged the people and instilled confidence in all members of the peoples and ethnic groups, and many people saw in members of the JNA hope that the nationalists will not accomplish what they are trying to do. I think that our activities also served as a warning.

If I were to characterize this period from 24 January to the present, that is, these 10 dramatic days in Kosovo from the viewpoint of the behavior of the nationalists, I

would divide it into two parts, the first being the period before the appearance of JNA units in the area of Kosovo outside barracks carrying out its Constitutionally defined duties and obligations, and the other the period after the army's appearance. The first period was marked by mass participation and violence by the nationalists and attacks on persons and property and on the unity of the country. In the second period the nationalists and separatists became keenly aware that the JNA was there. The activities of the nationalists and separatists have declined constantly since that time and they appear less and less frequently in public.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Many persons with whom we have spoken, including many foreign and Yugoslav newspapermen, have said that the army's emergence into areas outside barracks has had an unfavorable effect on lowering the intensity of operation of Albanian nationalists, at least in public.

[Silic] There are several reasons for such judgments, except the real one, that is, that the army, decisive and energetic, was in the most threatened areas and that it was the most serious warning to the nationalists and separatists. However, when we assess the current situation, we must say that it is not such that we can say that things have improved. It is gradually getting better, and the decisive behavior of the security forces and the army has made a vital contribution to this, but it will take some time for it to be finally rectified. However, I want to say that this action by the army is serving to interrupt the violence on the streets involving the use of weapons and to create the most favorable possible conditions for government agencies, above all, and the sociopolitical structures so that they can sit down and talk things over to determine what has to be done in the future to solve the Kosovo problem. Both programs and actions must be changed. A year has passed, and despite the current Yugoslav program, things have not turned out the way they were expected to. We must collectively determine what we have accomplished and see what ways and means we should try in the future. I must say that we members of the JNA are also aware that pluralism and everything that is happening, what is to be introduced into the Constitution and the laws, are inevitable; such is the situation in which we will live. No one is trying to avoid dialogue with those who are for democracy, for freedoms, for justice. But there can be no dialogue with those who try to reach their goals by sighting along a gun barrel. We are quite clear on this point.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Comrade General, also unavoidable in this interview and at this moment is a question to the commander of the Pristina Corps about the alleged use of arms by army units in crushing demonstrations. I know that there were denials by those who wrote about this, that this was carefully investigated both officially and unofficially, even by foreign newspapermen, and no proof whatever was found, but I would like for you as well to tell the public what you think about this matter.

[Silic] I have nothing either to explain or deny, because in all seriousness I say that there was no use of arms. There is no point in commenting on the attempts made in the communications media to show that members of the JNA used arms. I want to point out what is essential in our work. We never have trained and never will train our personnel to aim their weapons at the people. But we have trained them to aim their weapons, their hearts, and their minds against the enemies of our country and our peoples. Accordingly, the manipulations and everything that is done at the psychological propaganda level, all efforts by individuals to discredit the army, to paint the army as being against the people, are known to be carefully calculated by those individuals and their employers and are a function of the politics of the organs that sent the individuals working for them here.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] What ways are there out of this situation?

[Silic] We JNA members in the Pristina Corps clearly see what is happening. And I must say clearly and loudly here that all of us together are doing everything to calm down and stabilize this difficult, or more precisely, dramatic situation, and then to move the responsible structures, especially the government, to perform its functions. In these parts, I must say, above all the government has not been operating, and this is the source of many problems, above all those created by persons who threaten the freedom and dignity of man. Hence we advocate and will do everything that we can to set the mechanisms of government structures in motion at all levels, down to the local communities, in order to ensure the functioning of state power. At the same time, we want all sociopolitical structures to begin to perform their tasks, what they have outlined in their programs. But if this entire process is reduced merely to programs and statements and does not reach those for whom it is intended, then there will be no results. Consequently, also in changing the mode of operation of both the government and the sociopolitical structures the strategy must be oriented toward man as an individual; we must work with him, talk with him, mobilize him, and guide him, always for the purpose of improving in the situation. I emphasize the great bitterness of all our personnel, who ask themselves why it should be allowed in our legal state for such a large number of people not to work and why attempts should be allowed to place unemployment in the service of the nationalists and separatists. Only work and the results of work, and what the Federal Executive Council is doing at the level of economic reforms, can extract this country from the crisis, and Kosovo above all.

Insofar as we are concerned, despite the prolonged period of greatly increased mental and physical stresses and all those problems, from family-related to service-related, that the situation in Kosovo imposes on all the members of the Corps, we will continue to carry out our missions in a responsible manner. We require this attitude of others as well.

I want to point out expressly here that the security agencies, and here I place special emphasis on the Militia, in Kosovo have carried the heaviest load in this situation and have been subjected to brutal attacks by the most militant national separatist storm troopers. An especially long story can be told about the bravery and sacrifices made by these persons, and I propose that a more extensive account be published in the next issue of our newspaper.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Consider it approved. Lastly, a question, if I may, on behalf of the parents of the soldiers whom you command. What is the state of safety of the lives of personnel and what, expressed as concisely as possible, is the medical report on the Corps in this winter

season, when the personnel are subjected to round-the-clock mental and physical stresses?

[Silic] We have had no unusual incidents in which the lives and health of the men have been threatened, and we have had no manifestations of serious illnesses in the unit. In place of a longer reply, I want to inform all parents, and mothers in particular, that we are working here very responsibly with their sons. We are caring for their lives and health while training them to perform the missions for which they are in the army. I want to say that, just as if they were here with us, we are trying to return their sons to them safe and sound, after they perform their honorable and responsible patriotic duties in the garrisons and in the Kosovo area. We will surely succeed in doing so.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Unemployment Increase, Problems Examined

90GE0073A Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV
in German Vol 23, Mar 90 pp 417-424

[Article by Detlev Berg, diplomate in Law, employment counselor in the Labor Administration office in Goettingen: "Now the GDR Has Unemployed People, Too"]

[Text] At the beginning of February it is estimated that there were 50,000 unemployed in the GDR, and their number increases daily. This has long since affected not only the former staff employees of the Office for National Security which is being dissolved. Approximately 30,000 members of the National People's Army are in a similar situation. Organizations and administrative units are likewise being reduced in size, and even production sectors are caught up because unprofitable enterprises are being shut down or because new technologies are being introduced.¹ Yet the GDR Government is clinging to preserving full employment. Minister of Economics Luft has ruled out unemployment for the GDR for any length of time, but at the same time conceded that this might occur temporarily in connection with changes in economic structure. However, essential structural changes were neglected for decades. Thus, a particularly comprehensive shift of manpower to new jobs to break up the blockage which has developed is unavoidable. Also, no economist who wants to be taken seriously can maintain that structural change is a process which is bound by time.

The existence of unemployed people catches the GDR totally unprepared. The system of manpower management which was practiced until now contradicts market-economic principles, and the regulations of the labor code likewise came into being under conditions other than those currently in force.

2. Historical Development

Immediately after the end of the war, even in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, there was a pressing need to create as quickly as possible the prerequisites for rebuilding the economy and improving nutrition and food supplies for the people.

Control Council Order No. 3, dated 17 January 1946, dealing with registering that segment of the population able to work, registering the unemployed and how they are placed in jobs, as well as Order No. 65 of 15 September 1945 and Order No. 153 of 29 November 1945,² which were issued by the Soviet Military Administration, were the normative bases for national registration, management, and placement of manpower. This also included the appropriate rules of the German Administration for Labor and Social Welfare, for example, concerning the establishment of labor offices, registering all citizens able to work and their obligation to register, the approval requirement for changing jobs, implementing retraining and the opportunity for job

assignments for former Nazis and those citizens who wanted to escape regular work.³

In spite of this wide-ranging authority it was impossible to eliminate the high rate of unemployment which was mainly caused by the war. Thus, by virtue of Order No. 28 from the SMAD [Soviet Military Administration in Germany], among others, the 28 January 1947 ordinance on compulsory insurance to protect against unemployment went into effect.⁴

After the GDR was established, the right to work was made specific by the 19 April 1950⁵ labor law (GdA) to promote and care for the labor force, increase work productivity and for further improvement in the material and cultural situation of workers and salaried employees. Article 1 of the GdA defines this as the right to a job which is reasonable and matches the worker's abilities. As interpreted by the GDR this meant "eliminating unemployment as the scourge of the working people in the GDR once and for all."⁶ At the same time, however, considerable demands were also imposed on manpower planning and control, developing manpower reserves and systematically developing professional training. Articles 1 and 26 of the GdA and the ordinance on the tasks of the labor administration and on manpower control dated 12 July 1951⁷ contained specific predeterminations.

Since the mid-1950's the problem of unemployment in the GDR has officially ceased to exist. The annual average number of people registered as seeking work was last quoted in 1958 at between 15,000 and 20,000.⁸ The system traditionally made unemployment relating to market conditions impossible. Since then there have not been any statistics on unemployment caused by structure or turnover which is present in every industrialized society.

Up to the end of 1977 support for the unemployed was paid from social insurance in the form of "support during a temporary job loss through no fault of the worker." Of course these rates of support were so low that since 1954 they had had to be increased to the level of the respective support for social welfare. When the new labor code (AGB) went into effect on 16 June 1977⁹ the ordinances justifying unemployment insurance were dropped.¹⁰

In 1979 the State Secretary for Labor and Wages issued the order to increase the social capacity for work.¹¹ It replaced the 24 August 1961¹² ordinance on improving manpower control and vocational counseling which had been in effect up to then. Both statutory provisions contain wide-ranging authority on the part of the technical organs for labor and wages in controlling manpower.

3. Manpower Control System

Manpower use was an integral part of GDR economic planning. In order to put this into practice the State Secretariat for Labor and Wages¹³ until now had been at

the disposal of the Council of Ministers. Since the end of 1989 it has had the status of a ministry.

According to the law still in place, in addition to taking care of important tasks related to achieving the state's wage, wage-scale, and bonus policy, the development of accident prevention, the further development of the labor law and the social policy sector, this ministry also has extensive tasks in respect to manpower control:

It is supposed to prepare the principles for developing manpower reserves and for efficient use of the capacity for work in connection with socialist rationalization and the scientific organization of labor, for full utilization of time available for work and of the basic assets, as well as to control manpower and guide development of regular work forces.¹⁴ In addition, it is supposed to submit recommendations to the central state organs on systematic utilization of manpower reserves, on guaranteeing an optimal employment structure, on increasing shift coefficients and on better utilization of the work time available to complete tasks.¹⁵ By order of the Council of Ministers it is also taking care of tasks "related to the temporary employment of citizens of other countries."¹⁶

How is central manpower control taking place now? In the first place, the goal is the plan-based distribution of manpower using indirect control methods. Except in times of crises, the method in the form of a directive of assigning jobs, which is familiar from the early days of the Soviet Union, has been dropped, as has placement of criminals in a house of correction which used to be possible.¹⁷ Apparently those responsible in the GDR have realized that it is possible to expect sure motivation to work only when the commitment to work is entered into voluntarily by the worker who has made the choice in the context of the positions offered. Only in this way, at least to a limited extent, is it possible to develop such characteristics and abilities as joint thinking, readiness for initiative and awareness of responsibility which are mandatory for a work process which continues to become more complex. Accordingly, on the part of the workers, as a rule working conditions are established in contracts which are freely concluded. On the other hand, enterprises are subject to a wide range of restrictions on their freedom to conclude contracts. As a rule they may hire labor forces only in the framework of their centrally predetermined and balanced plans.

If required, in addition to these central predeterminations local organs get involved on a regional level. In order to handle these tasks the bezirk councils have offices for labor and wages to which in turn the offices for labor of the kreis councils are subordinate. Traditionally the following sectors have been in the lower authority:

- social capacity for work (manpower potential—employees index file);
- citizen consultation and card index;
- income from work, labor law, social and wage policy;

—scientific work organization.

At the direction of the bezirks, the kreis councils' labor office have the right to "issue to enterprises and facilities targets for efficient and full utilization of the social capacity for work and...declare hiring restrictions for combines, enterprises, and facilities."¹⁸ The extensive authority of the labor offices to control manpower is made specific in the previously mentioned order to increase the effectiveness of the social capacity for work. Accordingly, the state-owned enterprises, combines, socialist cooperatives and facilities as well as artisan and trade enterprises must, if requested, report vacant jobs to the labor office and must specify the requirements for the activity in question. They must inform the labor office without delay if vacant jobs which were reported are filled. Filling vacant jobs can be made dependent on the office giving consent. Enterprises must also provide the labor office with data on manpower and changes which occur.

The labor office can issue targets to the enterprises in respect to hiring citizens if socially or economically important reasons make this necessary. The enterprises are then obliged to offer the citizen, in keeping with the target, a work contract which matches his training, knowledge, and abilities. An unemployed person or, in officialese, a person without a working conditions agreement or someone who is threatened by dissolution of his work contract, was required to accept this offer since, as previously indicated, there had long since been no unemployment insurance or any other kind of social security. If a work contract which was offered was repeatedly refused, then even criminal prosecution for "asocial behavior" was possible.¹⁹ Targets can be issued to the enterprise in order to attract workers in the context of the provisions of the AGB for temporary or permanent activity in other enterprises in order to solve economically important tasks. In this, the labor office has the right to influence the selection of workers to be attracted.

In addition, the labor office can temporarily forbid enterprises from hiring workers, thus impose hiring restrictions. Public recruiting of workers by the enterprises requires the consent of the labor office.

There was little efficiency in this planning and control system. The state control measures were avoided by a substantial turnover movement. Given the traditionally utilized administrative means, the labor offices will not be able to cope with the tasks which must be solved.

4. Labor Law Provisions for Releasing or Transferring Workers

4.1 Amending Contract, AGB Article 49

In principle, the worker must only perform the tasks which he contracted to do. Of course, he can also be assigned to other work. In the case of temporary work at another location for up to four weeks, the worker must basically submit to this directive. However, if the period of time is longer then the consent of the individual

affected must be secured (cf. AGB Article 85). The agreements which were made in the work contract can only be altered by a contract, the amending contract according to AGB Article 49. This contract makes it possible for the enterprise, given continuation of the working conditions agreement, to adapt the agreements in the work contract to new requirements.

If in connection with rationalization measures or structural changes there are qualitative changes in work content, so that the agreed-upon job assignment no longer matches the requirements, the enterprise is obligated to conclude an amending contract with the worker in a timely manner, at least three months before the changes occur. However, this contract only takes effect if the person affected agrees.

4.2 Qualification Contract, AGB Articles 153 to 159

The AGB not only contains the right to, but also the requirement for further training. Under certain circumstances, a directive by the manager can also compel the qualification which the enterprise deems necessary. In this instance the enterprise must assume the resultant costs. This is also true of qualifications which are required because of rationalization measures. For workers who are prepared to conclude an amending contract as a result of a discussion held with them, there is the opportunity to qualify for the new activity by concluding a qualifying contract. If they do not yet have the required qualification for the agreed-upon new job assignment, their remuneration is nonetheless determined according to AGB Article 102, Paragraph 1, thus according to the wage or salary group of the agreed-upon job assignment.

The qualifying contract which must be concluded in written form contains the objective, beginning and end of the advanced training as well as agreements about shifts in work time or even releases. The enterprise is obliged to employ the worker later on in keeping with his acquired qualification. Contract cancellation is possible only if the worker proves to be unsuited to the job assignment for which he is trained, grossly violates his duties in the qualifying contract or civil rights duties or achieves inadequate results from his training in spite of extensive assistance. Cancellation is also possible if because of structural changes appropriate employment is not possible in the foreseeable future. Of course, the individual affected must first be offered reasonable activity in another enterprise. This cannot come as a surprise since any qualification which is broken off likewise means a lost investment for the state as employer.

4.3 Delegating Contract, AGB Article 50

Temporarily employing workers in another enterprise in the framework of so-called socialist help or to solve key economic tasks is controlled by the delegating contract between the three parties involved: the worker, the employing enterprise and the main enterprise. This must

contain agreement on length of the transfer, area of work, locus of work. To the extent there are no other agreements or regulations, the rights and duties of the working conditions agreement with the delegating enterprise continue in place. Only the wages which must be at least as high as before must be paid by the other enterprise. Once again, realization of the contract depends on the agreement of the worker. Moreover, amending and delegating contracts must not be used as a disciplinary measure or to circumvent protection provisions.

4.4 Termination Contract and Transition Contract, AGB Articles 51 to 53

Not cancellation, but rather the legally so designated termination contract is prescribed as the primary possibility for dissolving a working conditions agreement. This reflects two considerations: On the one hand, during contract negotiations the bad circumstances which led to the employee's desire to be separated can be identified and even eliminated. On the other hand, when concluding such agreements the termination date can be established in such a way that the interests of both parties, but especially those of the enterprise which is fulfilling the plan, remain protected.²⁰ Prior to concluding a termination contract the enterprise is supposed to offer a transition contract. This contract is an agreement between the current enterprise, the worker and the receiving enterprise. The day when the old work contract is dissolved, the beginning of the new activity as well as the locus of work and the job assignment which is now to be fulfilled must be set forth in the contract. The enterprise is always obligated to offer other reasonable activity in case it initiates dissolution of the contract. If a transition contract is necessary in connection with rationalization measures or structural changes, then the current enterprise must see to it that the appropriate contract is concluded in a timely manner, at least three months prior to the start of the new activity. The most efficient use of manpower is to be achieved by moving to a new enterprise. Moreover, uncontrollable fluctuations are to be largely avoided.

4.5 Dismissal Within the Period Prescribed and Dismissal Without Notice, AGB Articles 54 to 56

Dismissal within the period prescribed is permitted only if a change in production, structure or the enterprise's staffing and manpower plan makes it necessary, if the worker is not suited to the agreed-upon job assignment or if defects in the work contract cannot be eliminated by those involved. Dismissal by the enterprise within the period prescribed presupposes that it has offered the worker an amending contract to accept some other reasonable job or, in so far as that is not possible, a transition contract and the worker refused this offer. There is special protection from dismissal for certain groups of people. Thus, not only pregnant women, but also mothers with children up to one year of age, single workers with children up to three years of age or workers who are sick or on vacation may not be dismissed.

The AGB provides for dismissal without notice as a different kind of termination. It can be exercised only by the enterprise. A grave violation of socialist work discipline or civic duties which makes continued employment in the enterprise impossible is a prerequisite for this. As a rule, dismissal without notice should only be exercised after measures for education or discipline have proved to be unsuccessful.

4.6 Stopgap Money, AGB Article 121

This legal institution is an innovation in the AGB. It is granted to workers who as a result of rationalization means or structural changes are not in a position to accept a different job in the enterprise or through coordination with the responsible local council in another enterprise and thus for the foreseeable future will not be able to achieve their previous average pay even by virtue of qualification measures. They receive a one-time pay of stopgap money amounting to the total for the year of the anticipated decrease in the average pay.

If there are special conditions according to Article 121, Paragraph 2 of the AGB, it is possible to pay a large amount of stopgap money. The money which was recently discussed to tide over former state security office staff workers for three years is not part of this provision since the AGB is not to be applied to so-called security organs.

5. Outlook

5.1 Social Security Measure for Job Hunters

In order to avoid social conflicts the GDR's transitional government was forced to act quickly. Effective 1 February 1990, the Council of Ministers put into operation an "ordinance concerning guaranteeing early retirement money."²¹ If the working conditions agreement ends starting in the fifth year prior to reaching retirement age, workers and salaried employees are now entitled to early retirement money if they are no longer able to do the agreed-upon job assignment because a physician has certified nonsuitability, as a result of rationalization measures or structural changes or because of other reasons which they do not have to justify, if no other reasonable work in the enterprise or another enterprise or no reasonable retraining can be offered and they were subject to obligatory insurance and worked for at least 25 years (men) or 20 years (women), at least five years of which were prior to separation from the working conditions agreement.

The early retirement money, which at the request of the enterprise is granted until payment of retirement pension or disability benefits, amounts as a rule to 70 percent of the net wages of the past 12 months for those who worked full time. Workers can also obtain additional earned income up to 25 percent of the net wage which is the basis of calculating the early retirement money, however not more than M 400 per month. Early retirement money is not taxed, but is subject to compulsory contributions to social insurance. Upon request the

enterprise receives 50 percent of the monies paid out from funds in the state budget. The ordinance about granting state support and compensatory payment by the enterprise to citizens during the time that they are finding work represents another quick reaction to the presence of unemployed people.²²

Individuals who have left their last place of employment, who were engaged in the past 12 months in work in the GDR which was subject to obligatory insurance, who reported to the labor office to find a different job and for whom the office was unable to find reasonable employment are entitled to payment of state support.

If the person seeking employment gave notice himself, then the support is paid four weeks after the termination of the working conditions agreement at the earliest. Only after eight weeks do individuals who were dismissed without notice receive support. The support which is financed by the state budget amounts to M 500 per month. Workers whose last net wages were below M 500 receive support amounting to the previous average net wage. Part-time workers receive proportionate support. In addition, those affected are entitled to compensation from the enterprise in which they were last employed amounting to the difference between the support and 70 percent of the previous average net wage, but no more than M 500 per month. The compensatory payment does not apply in the case of workers who gave notice themselves or were dismissed without notice. The benefits which are paid upon application are at the same time justification for claiming social insurance benefits in kind.

This ordinance is in effect until there is statutory regulation of unemployment insurance and unemployment support. This makes it clear that it is possible first of all to prevent only the worst social impacts with this hastily adopted ordinance. The next step has been establishing comprehensive unemployment insurance and a functional labor administration in order to get control of the labor market problems in a social contract.

At the beginning of February there were at least 50,000 unemployed and 158,000 vacant jobs. The number of vacant jobs which were reported to the labor offices has decreased by 11 percent over last month, as reported to the press in East Berlin by GDR Minister for Labor and Wages Hannelore Mensch on 12 February. There is scarcely any need for the existing qualifications of those seeking employment. Jobs are primarily available for skilled and unskilled workers in production and the service sector—mechanics, construction workers, stokers, warehouse workers, nurses, waiters, and others. The contradiction between supply and demand will continue. On the one hand, administrative units will continue to become smaller, and on the other hand every day thousands will continue to leave the country, for the most part those with professions in which there is a manpower shortage anyway. On the other hand, a great many of those seeking work have completed advanced

school²³ or technical school and used to work for the party, state or state security.

A comprehensive training program is indispensable. An ordinance on retraining citizens to guarantee gainful employment is currently being developed. To date, retraining and continuing education had hardly played any role in the activities of the labor offices. These sectors have to be completely rebuilt anew. With its experience the FRG labor administration could actively support this building process.

5.2 Concerning the Need To Update Provisions Pertaining to Labor Law

The AGB contains a number of legal instruments concerning the efficient use of manpower. Of course, social conditions today are no longer the same as they were when the AGB went into effect. Scientific-technical progress has accelerated a great deal, and the GDR is opening up to market economy principles. Thus, the provisions pertaining to labor law must be updated even if they are really intended for the year 2000.²⁴

In the future enterprises must have the opportunity to fill or newly fill their management positions with people who meet the high technical requirements. This even includes replacing an average manager with one who has many initiatives, is versatile, and emphatically promotes new things.²⁵

If workers no longer meet the demands of the job, there must be the opportunity to shift them, even without their consent, to another job assignment which is reasonable and in keeping with their level of performance. In order to implement the principle of performance, opportunities must be created to hire workers on probationary status and to dismiss them again if they are not suitable. Above-average performance must receive above-average compensation.

The Ministry for Labor and Wages established a commission to prepare a new basic version of the AGB. The minister feels that even a new trade union law and reshaping the relationship between central regulations and basic conditions in the wage, work time or vacation sectors and by industry as well as enterprise control authority will substantially influence the content and design of a new AGB.²⁶

Of course there is not much time for those responsible to create the new regulations.

Footnotes

1. See NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 9 February 1990, p. 1. There are, of course, contradictory statistics as the East Berlin news agency ADN [German General News Service] likewise stated on 9 February. Thus, for example, the FDGB [Free German Labor Union Federation] used about 85,000 unemployed as its basis. Klaus Grehn, initiator for an association for unemployed people in the GDR, stated on 22 February in East Berlin that at present in the GDR there are about 70,000 unemployed

and by the end of the year we would have to anticipate an increase to at least 500,000, ADN, 22 February 1990.

2. See GDR Labor Law Manual, third edition, East Berlin, 1986, p. 467.

3. See *ibid.*

4. Published in: ARBEIT UND SOZIALFUERSORGE, No. 5, p. 103.

5. GDR GBl [Legal Gazette], p. 349 ff.

6. See GDR Labor Law Manual, *op.cit.* (Footnote 2), p. 474.

7. GDR GBl, p. 1037.

8. See GDR Manual, third edition, Cologne, 1985, p. 63.

9. GDR GBl, Part I, p. 185.

10. See the introductory law to the AGB, GDR GBl, Part I, p. 228.

11. GDR GBl, Part I, p. 115.

12. GDR GBl, Part II, p. 347.

13. Compare the statute of the State Secretariat for Labor and Wages, GDR GBl, Part I, p. 369.

14. See Article 8, Part 1 of the statute.

15. See Article 8, Part 2 of the statute.

16. See Article 8, Part 3 of the statute.

17. Thus even Lohmann, "The GDR's Labor Law," Berlin 1987, p. 29.

18. See Article 40 of the Law on Local Representation, GDR GBl, Part I, p. 213.

19. Article 249 of the GDR Penal Code, in the version contained in the Fifth Criminal Law Amending Law, GDR GBl, Part I, p. 335.

20. See E. Lieser-Triebnigg, "The GDR's New AGB," in DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 1977, p. 1268 ff.

21. GDR GBl, Part I, p. 42.

22. GDR GBl, Part I, p. 41.

23. At the press conference the minister indicated that 2.6 percent of the available jobs—a total of 4,121 positions—had been announced for advanced school cadres, especially those with a technical or medical orientation.

24. Compare V. Daehne and F. Kunz, "Tested for 10 Years as the Magna Charta of Labor," in: ARBEIT UND ARBEITSRECHT, East Berlin, 1987, p. 253 ff.

25. Compare W. Rodewald, "No Long-Term Law," in: ARBEIT UND ARBEITSRECHT, East Berlin, 1989, p. 277 f.

26. Interview with H. Mensch, minister for labor and wages, in: ARBEIT UND ARBEITSRECHT, East Berlin, 1990, p. 3 f.

POLAND

Growth in Regional Unemployment Rate 'Not Alarming'

90EP0505B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
10-11 Mar 90 p 2

[Unattributed article under rubric "Labor Market"]

[Text] As our paper's correspondents report, unemployment is growing in particular voivodships, but not in an alarming manner. In Bialystok, about 4,000 people have already been laid off, the most, 275, from the Voivodship Industrial Construction Enterprise. The Marchlewski Cooperative for Handicapped Persons reduced employment by 118. A fair number of employees, including blind people, were laid off by the Warynski Cooperative as well. There are not many jobs. The requirements are rising. No one wants trained professionals or entry-level people. In the whole voivodship, there are about 5,000 registered, unemployed people: the most are in Lapy, Sokolka, and Siemiatycze.

In the Lomzynskie voivodship, unemployment already amounts to 2,500 persons. 800 women are looking for work. 732 relief payments have been given out so far. There are scarcely 80 job openings and these are only workers' positions.

In Opole jobs await more than 900 persons. This includes 113 openings for women, and 799 for workers. However, there are almost 1,500 unemployed. The hardest to employ are economic technicians, automobile mechanics, agricultural technicians, and drivers. Brzeg, Nysa, Namyslow, and Kluczbork have the most unemployed.

So far in Krakow, 2,150 unemployed persons have been registered. Relief is being paid to 170 persons, and beginning next week that number will increase by 200. Nearly 100 enterprises in Krakow are announcing further reductions. Plans call for laying off more than 4,000 additional employees this month.

Regional Differences Noted in Breakup of Retail Monopolies

90EP0508A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
12 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Anna Sielanko: "Private Merchants Are Returning to Shops"]

[Text] How does one break up the retail monopolies so that this is not just another reorganization, as so many previous ones, but an actual conversion of ownership leading to the formation of real competition on the market? This undertaking turned out to be quite difficult

to carry out in practice, for several reasons. There are still a good number of outdated regulations, the present monopolists, understandably, are resisting, as is also the local administration, which in these matters has a great deal to say and do.

But slowly something is beginning to change on the retail-trade horizon, even though it differs in different parts of the country. In some voivodships the change began, rightly, with what could be done relatively the most easily, i.e., with placing the smallest units, meaning the shops, into private hands.

There are several courses of action here. In Warsaw, Lodz, Bydgoszcz, and a few other cities, the action began with public auctions of shop premises which were owned by the municipality but were used by socialized trade enterprises. The object of auction in this case is the lease. In the capital, where the first auctions were held in early February, a few shops are already open, operated by private merchants. Several others are being prepared for opening (repairs are underway). These are mainly, but not only, food and meat shops. They are primarily small (up to 50 sq m), but there are also larger ones (about 150 sq m). Other auctions are being conducted. After the initial experience, the organizers have modified their terms somewhat. For example, the deposit of guarantee allowing bidding at the auction was raised because the very low deposit encouraged "gamblers" to bid very high and later these persons did not undertake any retail activity at all.

In some cities, the present Voivodship Domestic Trade Enterprise [WPHW] or Spolem agents are becoming private merchants. In the capital, starting in April, a thousand former agency shops, mainly of Warsaw Domestic Trade Enterprise but also of Spolem, and the Fish Center, will change their status. They will be operated by the present agents, but on their own account, making lease payments to the owners of the premises (chiefly PGM).

In Katowice, the present WPHW is transferring 900 agency shops to private merchants. In 30 percent of the shops, the equipment is also being sold. But generally the merchants are having enormous difficulties in obtaining retail-trade equipment, therefore requests for exemption from sales taxes and customs duties on imported shop equipment appear to be justified.

A poll showed that 70 percent of the present agents would like to buy the premises they are using, but present regulations make these kinds of transactions impossible.

Monopolies of Industrial Enterprises Countered by Partitioning

90EP0511C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
13 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Magdalena Koszyk: "Multiplying by Dividing"]

[Text] With resistance, but nevertheless, the process of partitioning monopolies in the economy is under way.

This also pertains to industrial enterprises, concentrated by administrative decisions, often without economic justification, as far back as the 1970's and in some cases scarcely a few years ago.

What is happening in this area in the offices of the ministry of industry?

To the end of February, 201 new enterprises had been created. They were formed as a result of the partitioning of 19 multiplant insatiable demons. The largest number, 101, were created in the hard-coal industry, 71 of which were mines which became legal entities. Twenty-one Agroma plants obtained independence, 20 Megat, 7 Polsrebro, 6 Spomasz, 17 Ferrous Metal Mining and Metallurgy Combine, and 7 Kambud Building Stone Combine.

Preliminary proceedings are now under way to partition Ponar-Remo Machine-Tool Stock Management Combine, Transmeble transport enterprise in Poznan, Neptun Leather Industry Factories in Starogard Gdanski, Piaseczno's Polkolor, Mining Jobs Enterprises in Katowice, Polmak-Emak Mechanization and Automation Enterprises in Katowice, and Polcement in Sosnowiec.

Various power industry and brown-coal plants area also striving to separate themselves and become independent. This is a process which is compatible with the proposed liquidation of the Power Industry and Brown-Coal Community.

Naturally, every partitioning must be well prepared. Before the minister of industry makes a decision, a suitable team examines the justifiability of the partitioning, and expresses its opinion on it. After the decision to partition is made, an inventory commission, whose job it is to divide the assets, gets down to work. No one needs to be convinced that this is a difficult and thankless task.

Now being observed in the ministry of industry is a strong tendency to partition multiplant enterprises. The desire to merge small enterprises into larger ones is only slight, however.

The new task which the ministry will have to perform is the liquidation of enterprises which will be transforming themselves into one-person State Treasury stock companies. The first ones awaiting this procedure are the Unitra-Eltra Radio Factories in Bydgoszcz.

State Motor Transport Partitioning Discussed

90EP0511B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
15 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by K. Szczesniak: "Partitioning of the State Motor Transport"]

[Text] And yet, contrary to the pessimists, the monopoly in State Transport [PKS] will be broken up. The final bold decision was made on 9 March by premier Tadeusz

Mazowiecki when, at the request of the minister of transportation, he signed the order to partition PKS enterprises.

Transport is an integral part of the economy. A great deal depends on its efficiency, organization, and economics. But in reality that was not the case. The model of centralized transport enterprises was not very efficient economically and in addition a strong tendency towards monopolies appeared. In the large structures, economic figures were averaged and the weak were supported by the energetic. But that is almost past history.

On 30 June 1990, on the strength of the premier's decision, the National PKS and the PKS enterprises in Warsaw, Koszalin and Olsztyn will cease to function and their district boards and managements will be liquidated. At the same time, these enterprises will be divided, leading to complete decentralization of the organizational structures: 167 independent PKS enterprises will be formed which will concern themselves with passenger and freight transport. Their parent organ will be the minister of transportation.

In addition, other PKS enterprises which will become independent include 31 which will concern themselves exclusively with freight, 18 supply units, 13 rolling-stock repair units, and three construction-design enterprises. Except that their parent organ will not be the minister, but the voivodes and the mayors of Warsaw, Lodz and Krakow.

A new PKS Service Enterprise will be formed, which will include computer centers, a job training center, the PKS Central Transport Coordination Center from Poznan, and the Organization and Management Institute from Katowice. At the recommendation of the interested enterprises it will offer, for a fee, services in the area of transport coordination, preparation of timetables and tariff tables, settlement of accounts, training, consultation, etc.

It is difficult to list all of the benefits flowing from the breakup of the present structures. They are obvious—the object is to create a transport market. A market on which the best will be able to survive and those who cannot keep up will, unfortunately, bankrupt. In freight transport the seeds of competition are already there, for there are 450,000 trucks in private hands in Poland, while in state transport almost 400,000 trucks are in use. Ignoring the differences in the quality of this rolling stock and its load capacity, it is apparent that the chances for rivalry are the same. But until now, the state enterprises believed that they were in a worse situation because they were constrained by regulations, structures, and administration. In midyear, this argument will no longer be valid.

However, we do not know what the period after 30 June will bring, in the sense of structural and ownership conversions. It may be said that this is something that the government is no longer concerned about. The independent enterprise can merge into companies, enter

into agreements among themselves, and create cooperatives with the participation of small private haulers.

All of this, it is anticipated, will be for the purpose of adapting to local requirements and needs, with benefit to the customer. There is no doubt that a process of increasingly greater privatization of vehicle transport will begin. There will be sales of rolling stock to employees and other persons, as well as conversion of enterprises into stock companies, including employee stockholding plans, based on the law on privatization. The road to this has been opened.

Only passenger transport will be protected. First, because it is still being subsidized, and second, because of social reasons—to ensure travel to work, school, etc. That is why for the 167 enterprises concerned with passenger transport and passenger-freight transport, the parent organ will be the minister of transportation, who has to have an influence on tariff policy, for example, or fixing of timetables, so that it is possible to get to every part of the country. And in this area, some healthy competition would be desirable.

Transport Minister on Larger International Role for Airports, Ports

90EP0514A Warsaw ZOLNIERZ

RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ in Polish 6-8 Apr 90 p 4

[Interview with Franciszek A. Wieladek, Minister of Transport and Sea Management, by Janusz B. Grochowski; place and date not given: "The Transport Provinces?"]

[Text] [ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Is not life too comfortable for the enterprises that are subject to your department? Not only are the majority of them are monopolies in the market, but they still have no trouble reaching for a grosz from the state?

[Wieladek] I think that is a big exaggeration about comfort, because the field of maneuver for transport enterprises is significantly limited, even if only by the tasks for which they were created. Also, they can not count on special subsidies. Indeed, the PKP [Polish State Railroads] is supposed to receive 4.5 trillion zlotys from the state purse, compared to 720 billion received last year, but during that period prices rose ten times.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Prices rose for everyone. Meanwhile, that figure represents almost one third of this year's budget for the army.

[Wieladek] I do not want to bring up the fact that it is the duty of the state, just as it is to ensure suitable defense ability, to create the conditions for the efficient functioning of the transportation system, which means its subsidization as well. Let's also remember that nearly one million people work in this branch of the economy, and investments are very capital-intensive.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] The world earns money on transportation. In our country it is necessary to pay extra! Is that not strange?

[Wieladek] Where and on what does it earn? Most countries subsidize their railroads. In Austria, it has even gone so far that the parliament approves the budget.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] But not all...Perhaps the railroads should therefore be privatized, like in Japan. Or perhaps only the main, profitable lines should be maintained, like in the United States.

[Wieladek] I agree that in the past there were bandied about all too frequently slogans which spoke of the social mission of transportation, of its servitude to the nation, while the economic cost was ignored. And although I am trying to understand the ambitions of local communities which feel ennobled when a train whistles in their towns, I want us to begin counting with pen in hand and to stop operating some lines. The maintenance costs from these lines are often 100 times more than the revenues. Besides, the only profitable passenger connections are the expresses, and among freight connections, only those that cover long distances are profitable.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] In short, how many kilometers of rail lines should immediately be shut down?

[Wieladek] 1,177 are profoundly unprofitable. However, we intend to eliminate 200 kilometers of lines each year, taking into consideration the possibilities of other means of transportation to replace the railroad. Moreover, we will aspire to increase revenues by making the fare policy elastic.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] The proportional adjustment of rates to the level of inflation. In other words, we will have to pay more?

[Wieladek] Not necessarily. We want to marketize the fares all at once. To depart from fixing them administratively. And supply and demand have been forming the transport rates of the PKS [State Motor Transport] since November. We have delayed somewhat with the railroads, because they had a monopoly in the transport of some goods, but now the conditions exist to change that. After the division of motor transport and the formation of local self-government, I think that there would be nothing wrong with establishing passenger rates on the basis of the principles of competition also. But at the same time this demands the institution of a system of reduced rates, which is not a simple matter, because it is regulated by 14 laws.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] And so whom do you intend to deprive of them?

[Wieladek] Perhaps it can be put another way.... I will aspire to send reductions of a humanitarian nature, and not, as has been the case until now, a social supplement.

I am aware, of course, of the tremendous social resistance, and it would be good if this could be carried out before the end of the year.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Mr. Minister, perhaps rather than trying to extract a grosz from society, which in any case is getting poorer and poorer, it would be better to look for ways to cut costs. It can not be excluded that the directors of the enterprises that are subordinate to you will be angry with me, but I get the impression that many of them have learned to not think, and they have certainly learned how not to take risks, even though that is an integral part of doing business properly.

[Wieladek] I would agree with that opinion, but only in part. Transportation was indeed a clinical case of the command-allocation system. No one has been speaking about work, let alone service, which naturally is not favorable to the creation of the habits of the businessman. And now a little time will be needed for that.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Competition did not force that because there simply was none....

[Wieladek] That is an exaggeration. Shipowners and LOT had to compete on the world market in order to support themselves. In motor transport, the process of privatization is the most advanced. From among 800,000 freight hauls and deliveries on our roads, just a little under 400,000 belong to transport agents in the socialized sector.... In spite of the fact that incentives were created for the private sector.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Let's say honestly "in spite of the impediments applied to it by the Ministry of Transportation." This characteristic "help" did not improve the position of the PKS on the market. This organization continued to be too ponderous.

[Wieladek] In order to at last change things, the premier undertook a decision to decentralize the four, existing enterprises. This means granting independence to 240 former departments.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Are we not threatened by so many timetables, which are not always compatible?

[Wieladek] So that it will not come to that, we want to appoint a consulting firm, which would look at, among other things, the coordination of timetables. Also, the subordination of passenger enterprises, at least temporarily, to the transport ministry—for freight enterprises the voivodes will be the board of directors—is supposed to ensure the unity of the system.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Are you not afraid that the Ministry of Transportation will continue to be a superadministration of the enterprises, depriving them of their liberty?

[Wieladek] Although it is not easy to change certain habits among the ministerial cadre (not only due to the

fact that when there is a difficult situation, where do enterprises seek help?...In their ministry!) we are decidedly departing from the fulfillment of the function, as you said, of a superadministration. I want to stimulate transportation policy, to forecast needs, to supervise the carrying out of decisions undertaken, but not to administer in any way, and least of all to be an executive. Naturally, the state must have influence on how the resources distributed from its purse are consumed and on the investments made at the expense of the entire society.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] But do you have money for them? In the past, expenditures on transportation were one half less than in other countries.

[Wieladek] We can hardly expect there to be more when the country is emerging from a crisis.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] We dream of playing the role of the "platform" of Europe. So far, I see that with the transportation infrastructure that we currently possess, we will be on Europe's outskirts.

[Wieladek] I am devoid of the typical Polish megalomania, and I am trying to evaluate the matter realistically. Of course, we have an advantageous position, we can earn a lot on transit—and here there is agreement that we have not taken advantage of all the possibilities—but let's not exaggerate and say that they are so great. Rotterdam or Hamburg will never be surpassed by Gdansk or Szczecin, because they are located on the peripheries of world navigation routes. Our part in global transshipment and sea freightage amounts to just 0.75 percent, and I do not think that anything will change there. Therefore, it is more a matter of not falling behind, of keeping up....

At Okęcie [airport in Warsaw] we have world class runways. I believe that in June 1992 we will also have an airport that we do not need to be ashamed of. Of course, later it will have to be continually expanded, as will the entire network of international airports in our country, so that it could handle 10 million to 12 million incoming passengers annually. Possibilities also exist for the development of air freightage, which currently for all practical purposes does not exist. The military airports in Modlina and Goleniów are suited to that purpose. They could even become transit ports for cargo for Europe, especially since Frankfurt and Hamburg are already jammed beyond measure.

What would we say, we have a good railroad network. In the 1980's we modernized it, and the outcome had previously been unheard of in our country. The 150 million dollars that the PKP is supposed to receive soon from the World Bank will permit the automation of traffic control and the computerization of the firm. I believe that it is quite realistic that in 1993 a journey from Warsaw to Katowice or Krakow will take...two hours!

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Mr. Minister, how are we to keep pace in road construction when last year we barely managed to build a 14.5 kilometer section of highway from Tuszyn to Piotrkow?

[Wieladek] I am counting on foreign capital. There are actual offers being considered. The Japanese together with Dromex want to participate in the construction of the north-south highway. They propose to complete this investment in the course of three or four years.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] But that would mean that we would get 80 to 100 kilometers of new highways annually.... That is rather difficult to believe.

[Wieladek] However, it is realistic. Certainly not this year, when the budget has been trimmed to such an extent, but as for the future...Why are zlotys needed? Handing over highway construction completely to foreigners would be devoid of sense. Their part in joint investments should not exceed 20 to 25 percent, because they the possibility exists for repaying credits from the payments for using these arteries, and also exploiting its own potential. Moreover, being directed further by national interest, the quick completion of the construction of the highways running from the west to the east are more important.... For how many passengers to southern Europe can Scandinavia supply? And what are the possibilities and needs of the Soviet Union?

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Perhaps we would then succeed in forgetting about the "slaps in the face," such as, the Klaipeda-Sassnitz ferry line and the pipeline full of Soviet petroleum that runs through Czechoslovakia—though in both cases the route is farther than if it ran through Poland.

[Wieladek] If money is going to be counted and political factors are not going to be considered above all, I think that the Polish routes will become attractive. However, we can not get upset with the facts. We just have to stand up to the competition.

[ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ] Thank you for the interview.

Construction-Related Enterprises: Restructuring, Investments Sought

90EP0508B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
12 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview with Krzysztof Fidala, deputy minister, Land Use Management and Construction, by Andrzej Zielinski; place and date not given: "Competition in Building"]

[Text] [RZECZPOSPOLITA] The construction enterprises are now having a difficult time. The specter of liquidation is hovering over many of them. What does the ministry have to say about this?

[Fidala] I understand that this is a deceitful question. After all, you know very well that the ministry will not

intervene in the matter of an existence of an enterprise and decide whether it will exist, be partitioned or liquidated. That is a matter for the enterprises themselves, their managements, workforces, their own efficiency and skill in predicting...

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] And the parent organ will stand by and observe?

[Fidala] Very well. Let us talk about what pertains to the parent organ. The minister is the parent organ in relation to 307 enterprises, and more precisely, since March, to 292. This year, during the course of 2 months, 41 enterprises were transferred to the local authorities, and 11 were partitioned, as a result of which 37 new ones were formed. Anticipating your question, the 41 which the local authorities obtained, were not at all the weakest. Very simply, the enterprises which the local authorities took over operated on a typically regional scale.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What type of enterprises were most willing to be partitioned and why?

[Fidala] Primarily the construction transport enterprises. For example, Transbud Kielce was partitioned into seven new enterprises, Transbud Belchatow into five, Transbud Gdansk into three... But ZREMB Passenger Elevators Combine in Warsaw divided itself into seven new enterprises. The main reason is the economic situation of these units. After all, as a general rule the construction industry does not have monopolies which need to be broken up. The object, therefore, is to take action to prevent putting these enterprises into liquidation.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] We are speaking in the past tense. Have they been partitioned or is this process still under way?

[Fidala] It has just begun. At present, six applications for partitioning remain to be examined. We should expect the formation of 12 new enterprises. But please do not feel that we will necessarily strive to partition enterprises. They make that decision independently.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Of those which have been partitioned, the largest, such as Instal, Mostostal, Energopol, are missing. And yet these are the organizations which carry a heavy dividend burden on the reassessed parent fund. Are they so strong economically?

The industrial and specialist construction enterprises, particularly those of which you speak, are in relatively the best condition. They have a well-organized export capability and experienced workforces with high professional skills. In addition, they were always good and now have very quickly adapted themselves to other conditions. They are beginning to build housing, conduct municipal investments... The experience gained on foreign markets, where contracts have to be sought and customers obtained, is paying off. Although they, too,

are partitioning themselves. Work on partitioning Energo-Czeladz is under way—in an interesting way, incidentally—on the basis of a holding company.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Here we are touching upon the matter of the change in ownership relations in enterprises.

[Fidala] Yes, what is happening is just the first stage in restructuring construction enterprises, a portent of what will take place in this area. The enterprises want to transform themselves into stock companies with employee shareholding. Many of them are well along in their work in this direction.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] When, after the first quarter, the time comes to pay the first instalment of the dividend and the enterprises face liquidation or bankruptcy, then these processes will move faster, although I get the impression that they are now being artificially hampered.

[Fidala] That is a question for the government representative on ownership conversions. Although as far as the dividend is concerned, I share your opinion. Nevertheless we will not apply pressure or force anyone to do anything.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] We have talked the entire time about industrial and specialist construction enterprises. What about general construction?

[Fidala] I am not evading the question, although this is a matter for the parent organ, i.e., voivodes. Let me remind you that for at least 2 years we tried to persuade the construction combines to sever themselves from the house factories. Where this was done, good results are apparent. On both sides. Enterprises can freely choose a supplier of elements or a technology of construction. Factories, on the other hand, can produce all kinds of assortments. Actions aimed at similar separation of transport and equipment units from combines are also being observed.

How this can be done has been shown by the example of the Construction Combine in Skierniewice which transformed itself into six companies, divested itself of a house factory and an experimental range plant, and from a very poor firm under a board of commissioners, became a completely respectable holding company. In other words, general construction combines must also act differently than heretofore, otherwise they will find themselves in trouble.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] In which no one will help them...

[Fidala] After all, these are independent enterprises. The workforces must understand that their fate is in their hands. The minister or voivode will not come with a satchel of money. The times when enterprises were rescued by political decisions have ended.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] We can repeat after Bush—we will help you when you help yourselves.

[Fidala] Precisely.

Regular Annual Setbacks in Fishing Industry Viewed

90EP0505A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
12 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Zbigniew Wyczasany: "Out of Breath on the Seacoast"]

[Text] The matter is rather strange in and of itself. The whole world reaps a profit from the cultivation of the sea, and it is not a small one. In Poland, the exploitation of the sea's bounty and of the country's seaside position gets weaker with each passing year. Last year's preliminary data indicates that it was another year of regression. Turnover in the ports fell another 4.1 million metric tons (an improvement of results occurred only in the Polish Ocean Lines). The catch from fishing was lower by 70,000 metric tons.

And this regression in the sea economy, which was especially harsh last year, has lasted for almost 20 years. The decapitalization of fixed assets is exceptionally high here and it is no accident that no serious capital wants to become involved in our shipping industry. Results in line with our expectations and with world standards cannot be demanded from the sea economy in this situation. When the necessary resources are not invested in this economy over a period of decades, then the result is just the type we now have.

The whole time, navigation, ports, and shipyards have been operating in the international environment according to the principles of full competition. Actually, only the cadre of highly qualified workers are to thank for the fact that our sea-economy complex, in spite of having worse conditions in relation to foreign contracting parties from the start, continues to have significant participation in the revenues from global export of goods and services. In 1988, this participation amounted to more than six percent of revenues from the First Payment Region and 14.7 percent from the Second Payment Region.

These are not small figures. In 1988, the revenues of enterprises involved in the sea economy amounted to nearly 1.3 billion dollars and about 800 million rubles. Against the background of these results, the growing consumption of fixed assets in all sea enterprises is noteworthy.

Two of our largest shipowners are getting rid of their old ships, which can not withstand the competitive conditions in the world today. Polish Ocean Lines, for example, had just 97 ships with a combined capacity of 913,000 DWT at its disposal at the beginning of the year. Among those sold last year were four ships of the "Ro-Ro" type which were running to Australia. Although new, these turned out to be very costly to operate. Altogether, ten ships were withdrawn by PLO [Polish Ocean Lines] last year. However, only three new

units ("The Bydgoszcz," "The Tadeusz Wenda," and "The Wloclawek") were purchased.

The fleet, in the face of a smaller and smaller volume of Polish goods exported by sea and continually small transit, is doing its primary business by transporting goods between foreign ports. In this way the fleet is being transformed from a bureaucratically manipulated one to a moneymaking one. Polish shipments transported by the PLO's ships made up barely 37 percent of the whole of transports, whereas the shipments of foreign contracting parties transported between foreign ports made up more than 45 percent. (The rest, around 17 percent, was made up of shipments in transit).

The shipyards can not catch their breath. They are general-purpose operations. Unfortunately, the productive resources of the country do not keep pace with the world level. In the repair yards, there are great shortages in the supply of highly efficient machines and equipment.

Fishing, particularly deep-sea fishing, has effectively supplemented the balance of animal protein on the market for decades. The export of fish from shipside has also developed seriously, especially when the fleet cruised in search of fish in the far regions of the Pacific and the Atlantic. The catches of sea fishes have fluctuated in recent years from 619,000 to 680,000 metric tons. Last year, fishermen succeeded in landing just 532,000 metric tons of fish, of which 119,000 metric tons was from the Baltic.

Until September of last year, the prices of fish caught in deep-sea fisheries were regulated. In other words, the

budget supplemented them. But fishing was constrained by fanciful regulations and did not have means for development. Therefore, the deep-sea fleet is to a large extent obsolete, and in general this sector of the sea economy has an uncertain future. It is becoming more and more difficult to use good fisheries, because we do not have contractual access to them. There is no hope for a profitable growth of catches on the Baltic either.

As if fishing did not have enough problems, there are still more difficulties in collecting fish as a raw material for fish processing. As early as last year, with an eye toward the smaller supplies of raw materials, the production of canned fish products fell by half. In the face of higher credit rates in the first months of this year, fish canneries have almost nothing with which to produce. Moreover, storms have kept the cutter fleet, which catches the best fish for processing (sprat and Baltic herring), in port for weeks.

Free price formation for fish and fish products may lead these products, which have been very cheap until now, to meet the barrier of demand. The whole economy is learning to run its affairs in a new way. This is what awaits fishing as well.

Fishing continues to be an unwanted child. It was treated coolly, when sea affairs were subject to foreign trade, and indeed today they do not lie in the center of the transportation department's interests. The proposed agricultural market agency does not want to take in fishing, even though it involves many issues that are also of concern to breeders and meat producers. It will end when fisherman themselves take the affairs of fishing into their own hands.

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68

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